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Sammanfattning  
 
Mycket få människor trodde att ett nätverk bestående av kvinnorättsaktivister skulle kunna 
ändra det totala förbjudet mot abort i Colombia. Det colombianska samhället och politiken är 
starkt influerat av den katolska kyrkans värderingarna samt av den våldsamma interna 
konflikten. Alla tidigare försök att avkriminalisera abort hade misslyckats.  
Trots detta lyckades ett nätverk av kvinnorättsaktivister i Colombia delvis avkriminalisera 
abort i maj 2006, efter ett historiskt utslag i landets författningsdomstol. De som överklagat 
abortförbudet hävdade att en kriminalisering stred mot kvinnors internationella mänskliga 
rättigheter till hälsa och personlig frihet, som utgör en del i den colombianska konstitutionen. 
När domstolens beslut offentliggjordes innebar det en revolution för de som försvarar 
kvinnors rättigheter över hela världen.  
För att förstå hur kvinnorättsrörelsen i Colombia uppnådde en avkriminalisering av abort har 
jag intervjuat de representanter från kvinnorättsorganisationer, statliga institutioner och från 
den katolska oppositionen som varit inblandade i processen. Jag har sedan använt mig av den  
konstruktivistiska modellen ”the Spiral model of human rights change”, som förklarar hur 
transnationella nätverk kan inkooperera internationella mänskliga rättigheter på nationell nivå 
i stater som kränker dessa rättigheter. Till skillnad från författarna till Spiral modellen har jag 
valt att tillämpa en kontroversiell mänsklig rättighet på modellen: rätten till säkra aborter, för 
att kunna se om modellen även kunde förklara resultatet i detta fall.  
Jag fann att det var en kombination av faktorer som lett fram till att abort delvis 
avkriminaliserats i Colombia, bland dem att statliga institutioner är tillgängliga för 
medborgare samt att  staten tidigare åtagit sig att följa internationella mänskliga rättigheter. 
En annan anledning till framgången var det stora utbyte av värdefulla kunskaper om sexuella 
och reproduktiva rättigheter som skedde inom det internationella nätverket för kvinnors 
rättigheter. Men framför allt innebar processen för att avkriminalisera abort att det uppstod en 
livfull och effektiv debatt inom i landet, vilket ledde till att en tidigare kritisk allmän opinion 
svängde i abortfrågan. Bortsett från en delvis avkriminalisering av abort resulterade även 
processen i en nationell diskussion om genus och sexualitet, samt till en större öppenhet i 
samhället. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Problem Statement 
 
1.1.1 A conservative and violent society 
Hardly any people believed a few women’s rights activists would be able to change the law 
that prohibited abortion in Colombia. About 90 percent of the population is Catholic and even 
though Colombia was declared a secular state in the Constitution of 1991, there are still close 
ties between the state and the church. Catholic culture mirrors much of the society, influences 
the educational system and upholds a widespread male chauvinism in all parts of everyday 
life. (Brusco 1995:34-35) Abortion used to be such a sensitive issue that politicians were 
afraid to loose votes if they brought it up. All earlier attempts to change one of the world’s 
strictest abortion laws (for example in 1975, 1989 and in 2002) were quickly archived, 
sometimes before voting.  
The internal armed conflict in Colombia has made the country famous for being one of the 
most dangerous in the world. Murders, massacres and kidnappings are ways of getting rid of 
opponents and scaring others to silence. Human rights activists are extremely exposed and 
one of the most vulnerable groups is women’s rights activists. The conflict has also absorbed 
the politics and the media and postponed debates about modernity, gender and sexuality. 
(Linton 2005:153) Taken all in all, the conservative society and the excessive violence have 
not presented the most favorable conditions for promoting women’s rights in Colombia.  
 
1.1.2 A modern human rights centered constitution 
Colombia is a paradoxical society. Quite opposite to the difficult political climate, the country 
has one of the most modern Constitutions in Latin America. The Constitution of 1991 gives 
priority over national law to international human rights conventions ratified by Colombia.  
In 2005 women’s rights organizations in Colombia turned to the Constitutional Court with an 
appeal against the total ban on abortion. They pointed out the conflict between a 
criminalization of abortion and the international human rights, guaranteeing women’s rights 
to health and personal freedom, which are incorporated into the Colombian Constitution. The 
complainants claimed that the abortion ban contradicted Constitutional rights and should 
therefore be declared invalid. (Women's Link fact sheet)  
The abortion ban had the most severe effect on poor women which, unable to travel abroad, 
had to find a clandestine clinic or perform the abortion themselves. Approximately 250 000-
450 000 illegal abortions were carried out every year in the country.1 The Ministry of Social 
Welfare maintain illegal abortion as the third cause of maternal mortality in Colombia 
(interview with Lenis Urquijo Velasquez, Head of Public Health, Dec 27, 2006) 
In Latin America the legal status of abortion has changed very little and no Latin-American 
country has liberalized its abortion law since the 1940s.2 Consequently, in May 2006 when 
                                               
1
 Amnesty www2.amnesty.se/andranyheter.nsf/0/39eeac6b48907a9bc125702e00389eb9?OpenDocument  
La Mesa www.despenalizaciondelaborto.org.co/contenido.php?id_noti=7 
2
 With the exception of legal abortion upon demand in Cuba and the changes in the criminal code of Mexico 
City, where conditions for legal abortion were expanded to when the pregnancy threaten the health of the woman 
or when there is fetal abnormalities.  
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the women's rights movement in Colombia, despite of a conservative and violent society, 
succeeded in changing the abortion law by claiming women's international human rights; it 
was a revolution for women's rights defenders all over the world. 
In order to analyze how the women’s rights groups attained the decriminalization of abortion I 
use the Spiral model of human rights change, a constructivist model that explains how 
transnational networks can internalize and implement international human rights norms 
domestically in norm-violating states. (Risse et al. 1999:1-2)  I have investigated if the 
resources in the Spiral model can explain the decriminalization of abortion in Colombia or if 
other factors have been more important for the outcome.  
 
1.2 Objectives of the study 
This study has two main objectives; first I aim to analyze how the women’s rights network in 
Colombia was able to overcome the many obstacles they faced in the society in order to partly 
decriminalize abortion. I am interested to know why the network succeeded against all odds in 
2006, when no earlier attempts had been fruitful. The possibility to take the abortion issue to 
the Constitutional Court had been around since the court was founded in 1991, 15 years prior 
to the amendment.  In spite of this the total ban on abortions remained until 2006.   
The paradox of an extremely difficult political climate on one hand, and on the other a human 
rights centered constitution, was what first attracted me to this case. To understand the policy 
process and what was simultaneously going on in the Colombian society, I have interviewed 
different actors involved in the process.  
The second objective of this study is to further develop the Spiral model of human rights 
change. I am applying a contested human right; access to safe abortion, on a model 
scrutinizing the impact of more universally accepted human rights. I believe that if the Spiral 
model proves to be effective under the conditions in my case it could be possible in other 
difficult cases as well. (compare Esaiasson et al 2005:180) Throughout this study I aimed to 
answer the following questions;3 
 
1.2.1 Can the Spiral model of human rights change explain my case? 
To answer this question I traced the activities and the interactions among the involved actors 
in diverse stages, before and during the policy process that led to the partial decriminalization 
of abortion in Colombia. The key to process tracing is to find out the priority of events and 
how the most relevant actors were thinking at different stages of the process. (Esaiasson et al. 
2005:142, George and Bennett 2005) I then compared each episode to the phases of the Spiral 
model of human rights change to see if it corresponds to the assumptions in the model. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noticing that Risse et al. do not presume evolutionary progress in the 
Spiral model. The model is a varied upward or downward spiral through which international 
norms can lead to changes in behavior. Individual countries may get caught in or skip certain 
phases of the model. (Risse et al. 1999:18-19)  
 
1.2.2 What enabled a partial decriminalization of abortion against all odds?  
To explain how the women's rights movement succeeded in decriminalizing abortion in 
Colombia, despite of a conservative and violent society, I have developed the Spiral model by 
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 More detailed questions can be found in the chapter discussing the Spiral model of human rights change. 
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dividing my findings into factors that either promoted or prevented the features in the model, 
and finally the outcome of my case.   
 
1.3 Scope of the study 
I decided to focus on the period from December 2004 when the women's rights organizations 
started to prepare an application for a summons of the Constitution regarding the law on 
abortion, to May 2006, when the Constitutional Court gave its final decision. But since the 
struggle for abortion rights in Colombia hardly began in 2004, nor ended with the courts 
decision, I also present former attempts and difficulties. A short summary of the events since 
May 2006 can be found after my final conclusions. Additionally, at the end of this essay, 
there are suggestions for future research.  
I am aware that the time that has passed since the Constitutional Courts´ decision in May 
2006 has been to short for me to completely examine the fifth and last phase of the Spiral 
model, which is the phase of implementation and rule-consistent behavior. The work to 
implement the new regulations is still in progress and there will be several years until we can 
comment on the final results. 
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2. Theory and previous research 
 
2.1 Transnational networks and the LAICIA network 
 
2.1.1 The LAICIA network – a transnational advocacy network 
On April 14, 2005 a complaint was filed to the Constitutional Court in Colombia, which 
petitioned the review of the constitutionality of Article 122 of the Penal Code. This article 
criminalized abortion without exception and classified it as a crime against life and personal 
integrity.4 A pregnant woman or a person who performed an abortion could be sentenced to 
one to three years imprisonment.5  
The complaint maintained that the criminalization of abortion, in cases such as when the 
pregnant woman’s life or health is in danger, when the pregnancy is the result of rape and/or 
when the fetus has impairments incompatible with life outside the womb, violated several of 
the human rights in the Colombian Constitution. (Women's Link fact sheet) Behind the 
complaint was a network of several women's rights organizations and individuals working for 
a decriminalization of abortion in Colombia. A number of international human rights bodies 
and organizations were also part of the wider network. The project was called High Impact 
Litigation in Colombia: the Unconstitutionality of Abortion, or LAICIA, an acronym of the 
name in Spanish.6  (Roa 2006:223) I will hereafter refer to the organizations and other 
partners behind the complaint as “the LAICIA network”.7 
The LAICIA network has many similarities with transnational advocacy networks: networks 
of activists that often exercise influence internationally and domestically in value-laden 
debates about for example women's rights. (Keck and Sikkink 1998:9) 
Transnational advocacy networks are networks of national and international non-
governmental organizations (NGOs)8, local social movements, academics, legal 
representatives, mass media, government officials and others working together to promote and 
implement international human rights. These actors are bound together in networks because of 
their shared values and a common discourse, as well as their creative use of information and 
the belief that individuals can make a difference. (Keck and Sikkink 1998:1-2, 9) 
These networks work through production, exchange and strategic use of information in order 
to influence the political agenda, the debate or policies in issues important to them. They are 
challenging sovereignty via both national and international activism and sometimes they can 
use international law to prove their point. Domestic and international NGOs are often the 
                                               
4
 Colombian Penal Code 2000 Art. 343. (Center of Reproductive Law and Policy 1997:77) 
5
 Due to a change in the law a woman who had an abortion after a rape could have her sentenced reduced to 
between four month and a year. In the case of an abortion performed on a woman under the age of fourteen the 
sentence was three to ten years of imprisonment. Colombian Penal Code 2000 Art. 343, 344. (Center of 
Reproductive Law and Policy 1997:77) 
6
 Litigio de Alto Impacto en Colombia: la Inconstitucionalidad del Aborto. 
7
 The LAICIA network is a network of many different actors, among them lawyers specialized in sexual- and 
reproductive rights, international organizations such as Women's Link Worldwide, individuals and a multitude of 
Colombian organizations, for example the National Network for Women, Catholics for a Free Choice, The 
network for Women's Life and Health and many others. 
8
 A NGO is a non-governmental, non-profit making, voluntary, service/development oriented organization.    
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driving force in advocacy networks, as they are the first to take action and to pressure more 
powerful participants to follow. (Keck and Sikkink 1998:9, 16) 
Transnational advocacy networks were largely ignored and it was not until the late 1990´s that 
political scientists began to understand the power of international networking. The advocacy 
networks strategic use of information can seem harmless compared to the economic and 
military institutions that govern the world politics, but transnational advocacy networks have 
proved to have leverage in many battles over human rights in different countries. When they 
succeed they are an important part of the explanation for changes in world politics. (Keck, 
Sikkink 1998: preface x, 1-2, 9) 
Daniel C. Maguire, professor of religious ethics, points to the great influence of civil society, 
mainly women-led nongovernmental organizations, in the field of sexual and reproductive 
rights. These organizations have persistently worked for women’s rights and health and have 
probably played the most important role in promoting change and a consensus with respect to 
sexual and reproductive health. The international women’s health movement is a loose but 
effective network that has created public awareness and understanding, demanded 
accountability and greatly influenced the adoption of international agreements. There is less 
knowledge of the endorsement of other parts of civil society, a number of philanthropic 
organizations offering financial support for the institutional development of the network. 
(Maguire 2003:259) 
 
2.1.2 Transnational networks no recent phenomena 
 
The history of transnational advocacy networks goes back to the campaign to end slavery in 
the United States in the mid 19th century and the international suffrage movement in the early 
twentieth century. These ancient transnational movements did not have the modern 
communication technology of nowadays, but their strategies were amazingly similar and 
sometimes just as successful as today.  By this time the ideas of abolishing slavery or to gain 
the vote for women seemed almost unthinkable. It is precisely one of the core tasks of 
transnational advocacy networks to make the unimaginable possible, by framing problems so 
that their solution comes to appear inevitable. (Keck and Sikkink 1998:39-41)  
 
2.1.3 Transnational advocacy networks frame their issues  
Transnational advocacy networks frame issues, meaning that they market an issue by giving it 
a new framework that will win leverage and make it concern other people. Framing is all 
about raising interests for an issue or to change focus in the debate by using symbolism or 
showing the impact in real people’s life. (Keck and Sikkink 1998:16, 25) A good example of 
framing is the campaign on the practice of female genital mutilation. In the 1970´s networks 
of women rights activists gave the phenomenon a new name: instead of female circumcision 
they called it female genital mutilation, a name associated with the torture this treatment 
involves to women. They spread information about this not being a harmless cultural custom, 
but instead containing violence and discrimination against women. The networks reframed the 
issue as a violation of women’s human rights and the campaign generated action in many 
countries and within the United Nations. (Keck and Sikkink 1998:19-20)  
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What is taking place internationally can also be resourceful for advocacy networks, for 
example when the United Nations announced ”the International Women's Decade”. 
Transnational networks can also “shame” powerful authorities by holding them responsible 
internationally, until they do something about the issue at question. (Keck and Sikkink 
1998:16, 25) 
 
2.2 Social constructivism 
 
2.2.1 Social constructivism – an alternative theory of international change 
Until the debate on globalization emerged at the end of the 1980´s, classical theories such as 
realism and liberalism had dominated the discussion on change in world politics. When these 
theories failed to recognize the end of the Cold War many theorists started to turn towards 
social constructivism, which focused on social and ideational factors of changes in 
international relations, rather than the material structures. In the 1970´s the research on 
transnational relations was for most part about the Marxist vs. liberal controversy on whether 
transnational companies hindered or promoted world politics. (Risse 2002: 257, 259-62) 
During the 1990´s researchers started to concentrate on value-based advocacy networks and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The debate was first centered on the actual 
influence of transnational networks and NGOs and if they could replace the nation states in 
world politics. Today the discussions focus more on the interaction between states and 
transnational advocacy networks, and under which conditions the latter influence decisions 
and outcomes in domestic and international politics. (Risse 2002: 257, 259-62)  
 
2.2.2 The process of norm socialization 
The process that makes it possible for transnational advocacy networks to nationally 
internalize and implement international human rights norms is understood as a process of 
socialization, which can be defined as induction of new members into the ways of behavior 
that are preferred in society. This presupposes a society, in this case the international society 
of human rights norms. In this process individual beliefs about right and wrong become 
collective expectations about proper behavior. This creates impetus for behavior consistent 
with the belief and influences the performance and domestic structures of the state. These 
behavioral effects of international human rights norms can be explained through social 
constructivism, a theoretical concept that relates interests of actors to their identities within 
the group. (Risse et al. 1999:7-9)  
The political identity of a state does not emerge in isolation but in relation to other states and 
international non-state actors, so the socialization process may be useful to understand how 
norms are transmitted. The goal of socialization is for actors to implement the norms so no 
external pressure is needed to live up to them. The socialization process is actually three 
processes going on simultaneously: adaptation, argumentation and institutionalization. At 
first the state adapt to the international community by adjusting its human rights behavior, 
without necessarily believing in the norm. In the second process the state is engaged in an 
argumentative discourse of communication and pressure from the advocacy network, and in 
the third phase the norm is institutionalized. (see Figure 1.1) The more the state is engaged in 
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dialogue with networks, the more likely it is to accept the human rights norm and to start 
practicing it. (Risse et al. 1999:11-13, 16-17)   
 
Figure 1.1   The process of norm socialization (Risse et al. 1999:12) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3 Norm socialization in Colombia 
I consider that in 2005, when the LAICIA network filed its complaint to the Constitutional 
Court, Colombia was in a process of adaptation, meaning that the state had adjusted to the 
international human rights community by instituting a human rights centered Constitution in 
1991. Due to the Constitution the State had also established new institutions and mechanisms 
for citizens to claim their fundamental rights. Risse et al. point out that many states wish to 
belong to the category defined as “liberal democratic states”. Therefore they change their 
norms and rules to be identified by others and themselves as liberal democratic states. (Risse 
et al. 1999:8) 
 
2.3.1 New opportunities for women's rights movement 
The adaptation of the Colombian state to international human rights represented new 
possibilities for the women's rights movement to demand full compliance with these rights. 
The opportunity for change depends not only on the mobilization of advocacy networks, but 
also whether these networks are able to “hook into” state institutions. The degree of success in 
achieving political goals depend on the opportunities that state institutions offer to social 
movements. The relationship between advocacy networks, the state and the church shapes the 
“fit” between the actors demanding change and the state agencies with the power to make 
changes. (Htun 2003:17)  
 
2.3.2 The constitution of 1991 
The Colombian Constitution of 1886 was very traditional and reflected the reality of the time. 
A hundred years later Colombia was a nation in deep political crisis with an internal armed 
conflict that violated the population’s most fundamental rights. Although the old Constitution 
Principled ideas / international norms
Adaptation and strategic 
bargaining
Moral consciousness-raising, 
argumentation persuasion
Institutionalization and 
habitualization
Internalization of norms in 
identities, interests, behavior
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had gone through minor changes over the years, the country was in desperate need of a 
modern constitution that could give possibilities for political legitimacy and peace.  
The new Political Constitution of Colombia became law on July 4, 1991 and it declares 
Colombia a secular state where all religions are proclaimed equal. In the early 1990´s, when 
the Constituent Assembly was selected to write the new Constitution, more than half the seats 
went to non-traditional political parties, such as indigenous- and left-wing parties. However, 
the abstention rate to elect the assembly was extremely high at 74 percent, and the political 
party that had endorsed the process, the Alianza Democrática-M19, had been dissolved. 
Consequently the support for the Constitution is weak in the political establishment. Many 
conservatives believe the Constitution to be too liberal, while the guerrilla movement refers to 
it as mere window dressing.9 (Livingstone 2003:80) 
 
2.3.4 Human rights oriented institutions 
The Constitutional Court, which was founded to monitor the Constitution, consists of nine 
magistrates whom have among their obligations to study and issue a ruling in cases of 
unconstitutionality initiated by citizens (acción publica de inconstitucionalidad). Any citizen 
can make a complaint of a law before the court, if she believes the law to be contradictory to 
the Constitution. (Center for Reproductive Law and Policy 1997:72) Even before the 
establishment of the Constitutional Court citizens could appeal against articles of the 
Constitution, but there was no institution that specifically handled these complaints. 
(Interview with Karin Kuhfeldt, Human Rights Ombudsman, Dec 1, 2006)  
A citizen does not need a lawyer to appeal to the court, nor to present a case of a specific 
person. Hence no person has to “borrow” its case to put it in the public eye. (Roa 2006:226) 
However, both the action of unconstitutionality and the tutela10 have their limits. The power 
of the judges is limited and they can not order compensation to the complainant. (Cabal et al. 
2003:55) In connection to the establishment of the constitution the State also founded the 
Human Rights Ombudsman (la Defensoría del Pueblo) whose task is to defend the citizens´ 
rights in different areas such as women's, children’s and displaced people’s rights. 
 
2.3.5 The Constitution gives priority to international human rights 
In Colombia international human rights conventions serve as a basis of interpretation of 
constitutional laws.11 Every international human rights convention and treaty that the State 
has ratified12 is an integrated part of the Constitution and is given priority over any other 
national law. (Center for Reproductive Law and Policy 1997:73) This is established in article 
93 of the Constitution; “international treaties and agreements that recognize human rights 
ratified by the Congress…take precedence over national laws.” This article means that if any 
national law is viewed by the Constitutional Court to conflict with ratified international 
                                               
9
 In recent years a new political party, El Polo Democratico, which supports the constitution and got about 25 
percent of the votes in the 2006 elections can be added to the political spectrum. (Livingstone 2003:80) 
10
 A tutela is a less formal complaint that can be presented to any judge by a citizen considering that her 
fundamental rights have been violated.  
11
 Political Constitution of Colombia, art. 93, 230.  
12
 Ratification of an international convention by a state means that the state acknowledges the validity of the 
convention.  
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human rights conventions it can be declared unconstitutional and therefore invalid. (Cabal et 
al. 2003:57)  
 
2.3.7 The Constitution gives citizens access to state institutions 
For transnational advocacy networks there are several resources that are important to succeed 
in the struggle for a political objective: national and international contacts, the willingness of 
powerful actors to cooperate, or the possibilities to affect them. This will give the networks 
access to information and the ability to handle it strategically. The more assets available (or 
that can be created) the bigger is the opportunity to reach ones goal. (Keck and Sikkink 
1998:16, 25)  According to Risse et al. this societal openness with responsive institutions, 
which is both a cause and an effect of human rights networks, facilitates network socialization 
and gives opportunity to reach out to the state. It is a very important key to human rights 
work. (Risse 1999:262-264)  
Despite the lack of support for the Constitution within the political establishment in 
Colombia, many human rights advocates and civil society groups believe that the constitution 
has given rights to those people who did not use to have any; women, indigenous peoples and 
internal refugees, among others. (Livingstone 2003:80) According to Amnesty International 
the Constitutional Court has done much to promote the rights of women in Colombia, but 
there is till much that needs to be done; “On a number of occasions, its jurisprudence has 
helped to affirm the principle of equality, the prohibition of gender-based discrimination and 
the protection of women’s human rights. (…) The Human Rights Ombudsman has also 
worked hard to promote issues relating to the situation of women. (…) These efforts are 
appreciated but they are in an early stage and lack resources. The State has failed to 
implement their international obligations to protect and promote women's human rights.”  
(Amnesty Report 2004:13-14) 
 
2.3.8 The Constitution - a window of opportunity 
In 2004, Mónica Roa, a Colombian lawyer working for the international organization 
Women's Link Worldwide, and her partners saw the constitution of 1991 as a window of 
opportunity. The constitution was an accessible and powerful tool for human rights 
organizations and advocates to claim human rights within the society. (Roa 2006:226-227) 
The public action of unconstitutionality and the tutela have been key instruments to the 
advancement of sexual and reproductive rights in Colombia. These two mechanisms have 
permitted for a debate on issues of health and reproduction and have allowed citizens, and 
especially marginalized groups, to utilize the juridical system to precede their demands for 
justice. (Cabal et al. 2003:52)  
The complainants claimed the criminalization of abortion violated several of the articles in the 
Constitution, articles that were based upon ratified international human rights.  In the 
complaint it was argued that the criminalization of abortion went against women's right to 
equality and to non-discrimination13. The plaintiffs maintained the right to life, health and 
integrity14 and advocated that if women are forced to carry unwanted pregnancies to term it 
                                               
13
 Political Constitution of Colombia Art.13 
14
 Ibid Art. 11, 12, 43, 49 
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violates their right to dignity, reproductive autonomy and the free development of 
personhood15. (Women's Link fact sheet) Colombia had received multiple requests by 
international human rights bodies to review its strict law on abortion, and since no measures 
to liberalize the law had been taken by the State, a few of these recommendations were 
included in the complaint. (Women's Link Fact sheet) 
 
2.4 The reality of human rights in Colombia 
Despite the human rights friendly Constitution of 1991 the women's movement had not 
succeeded in decriminalizing abortion in any of its earlier attempts. Even though the 
Constitution gave certain support to women's rights groups, the reality around them was far 
from encouraging. According to the Colombian anthropologist Mara Viveros the country’s 
political culture with weak citizen participation, a strongly influential Catholic Church and a 
patriarchal society have presented many obstacles to the struggling women's rights groups. 
(Viveros 1997:11) 
 
2.4.1 Difficult situation for women's rights defenders 
The overall situation for human rights activists is very difficult in Colombia and the most 
vulnerable groups are union members, lawyers, indigenous people and women’s rights group. 
In addition, Colombia has one of the biggest rifts between high- and low income earners in 
Latin America, as the richest ten percent stand for almost half of all the consuming in the 
country.  (Swedish Ministry Foreign Report 2006:1-2, 16) 
For over 50 years a civil armed conflict has struck very hard on the Colombian society.  The 
conflict is described as a “new war”, characterized by many actors and systematic crimes 
against human rights that render possible through a criminalized economy and a weak state. 
(Kaldor 1999) The armed conflict has its origin in the 1950s when extreme violence broke out 
because of the murder of a popular political leader and consequently hundreds of thousands of 
people were killed. To seize the violence between political opponents a referendum decided 
that the Conservative and the Liberal parties should alternate the presidency every four years. 
This power-sharing was called the National Front, and it made formally that the political 
system only was accessible to the elite. The political exclusion led to the establishment of 
guerilla groups, and this in turn made landowners, with support of the government, to create 
paramilitary death-squads to wipe out the guerillas. In the 1980s and 90s Colombia was ruled 
by drug-traffickers, both from the paramilitary and the guerilla groups, and anyone who spoke 
out against them had to pay with their lives: thousands of judges, lawyers, political opponents 
and human rights activists were killed. (Livingstone 2003, Tate 2007:45) 
The armed conflict has created about 3 million internally displaced refugees, referred to by 
the UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, as a humanitarian 
catastrophe. The majority of the refugees are women.  
 
2.4.2 Sexual violence and discrimination against women 
According to the Amnesty report “Scarred bodies, hidden crimes” girls and women are the 
unknown victims of the conflict in Colombia. All armed groups, illegal as well as legal, have 
                                               
15
 Constitution Preamble and art. 1, 16, 42 
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sexually abused and exploited women, both civilians and combatants, throughout the conflict. 
Women’s bodies have become marked as military targets. (Amnesty 2004:17) 
Testimonies of survivors indicate that especially paramilitary groups have been using sexual 
violence16 to punish people for perceived collaboration with guerillas, to “dishonor” the 
enemy or to make communities leave their land of military or economical interest. It is a 
battle among men fought over the bodies of women. A young woman who talks, who can 
express herself, is seen as subversive. (Amnesty 2004:17) Women are treated like they were 
minors when it is in fact a question about their own bodies and sexuality. Rape is heavily 
under-reported and very few perpetrators are ever brought to justice for any human rights 
violation, and even fewer for crimes of sexual violence. (Human Rights Watch website)  
 
2.4.3 Access to sexual and reproductive health 
Unwanted pregnancies are very common in Colombia, especially among teenagers, where as 
many as 20 percent of girls age 13-19 are mothers or have been pregnant at some point.  
(Profamilia National Questionnaire on Demographic and Health 2005:26) The total ban on 
abortion has forced girls and women to find illegal clinics or to try to terminate the pregnancy 
by themselves. Many of these illegal “doctors” are nothing but quacks and the standards of 
hygiene are poor.17 (Linton 2005:141) 
Illegal abortion is the third leading cause of maternal mortality in Colombia. (WHO report) 
Almost 30 percent of Colombian women that undergo an illegal abortion suffer complications 
and 18 percent arrive to the hospital in an extremely severe condition. Among poor women 
about 50-60 percent experiences complications.18 (Center of Reproductive Rights report 1998)  
Reproductive health services in Colombia are provided mainly by the private institution 
Profamilia (Colombian Family Welfare Association). Even though Profamilia does voluntary 
work in poor communities, most of its services are not free and the access is restricted, 
particularly for poor and/or internally-displaced women.  
In cases of collective displacement, the state provides extremely limited emergency aid, 
which does not include reproductive health care. Public institutions do not provide the 
survivors of sexual violence with free services, not even emergency contraception. In areas 
under military dispute it has become increasingly difficult for women to gain access to sexual 
and reproductive health care services. Many are forced to travel long distances to obtain help. 
Women’s organizations have tried to fill the gap left by the state to take care of victims of 
sexual violence, but have themselves been threaten and attacked because of their work. 
(Amnesty report 2004) 
  
2.4.4 The Catholic Church 
                                               
16
 According to the 1993 Vienna Declaration on Human rights sexual violence is understood to be murder, 
systematic rape, sexual slavery, sexual assault, forced pregnancy, forced contraception, sterilization or enforced 
abortion. “Scarred bodies, hidden crimes” Amnesty 2004:46-47  
17
 According to disputed information about half of the illegal abortions in Colombia are carried out by skilled 
professionals in safe underground clinics run by different women’s groups.  
18
 El Tiempo: “Abortion something at style in the University” Oct. 6, 1998 and “Latin America aborting in 
masses” April 28, 1994. Both articles referred to in “Women's Reproductive Rights in Colombia – A shadow 
report” 1998 p. 9 by Center for Reproductive rights www.reproductiverights.org/pdf/sr_col_1298_eng.pdf  
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According to Elizabeth Brusco, specialist in religious movements and gender in Colombia, 
the Catholic Church in Colombia has a reputation throughout South America to be especially 
powerful and influential in national life. The state has been remarkably willing to hand over 
public authority over major areas of the lives of its citizens to the Catholic hierarchy. In 1887 
the state signed a Concordat with the Vatican for complete Church - State integration which 
defined the church as “an essential element of social order”. Before 1973 children had to 
present a Catholic baptismal certificate to be allowed to enter public schools. To be 
Colombian meant to be Catholic. No other alternatives existed; the religious affiliation was as 
much a birthright as was citizenship. Excommunication from the Church meant not only 
damnation in the afterlife, but in the present life as well. (Brusco 1995: 15, 32)  
The concordat went through small changes over the years, but not until 1992, as a direct 
consequence of the new Constitution, a new Concordat was signed. This took away the 
church’s right to decide over family law and abolished obligatory Catholic education in 
schools. (Brusco 1995:33) Since the Catholic Church has been very influential in many 
Colombians´ lives it has also deeply affected the way people think about gender roles, 
sexuality and abortion.  
 
2.4.5 The culture of machismo 
There is one term that is unambiguously associated with Latin American culture: the term 
“macho”. (Melhuus et al. 1996:14) The nature of the machismo culture is best summed up in 
a statement made throughout the region; “la mujer es de la casa y el hombre de la calle” (the 
woman belongs to the house and the man belongs to the street). Machismo is described as the 
biggest weight on the Colombian family, constantly present in the highest levels and the 
lowest, in the cultivated and in the illiterate. (Brusco 1995:82, 106) 
Machismo emphasizes male strength and men’s right to control women, which contributes to 
polarization of gender roles and culturally legitimating the abuse of women. There are 
different views on the origin of machismo in Latin America, ranging from the humiliation 
suffered by indigenous men when the Spaniards conquered them and their women, to being a 
mean of structuring power relations between men; that drinking, fighting and the conquest of 
women are performed with two audiences in mind; other men and oneself, to whom one must 
prove one’s masculinity. It should not be forgotten that even among many Latin American 
women there are socialized expectations that their men should “act like men”. (Chant et al. 
2003:13-16)   
The armed conflict in Colombia puts additional pressure on men and boys to live up to a 
destructive machismo culture. Previous research has shown that during armed conflict 
domestic violence against women increases. (Amnesty 2004)  
The Colombian state has been criticized by international human rights bodies and 
organizations for contributing to the cultural oppression of women. Although the state has an 
international obligation to combat gender-based discrimination and prevent and punish 
violence against women, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) noted “that no systematic work has been carried out to confront 
discriminatory cultural traditions or to change sexist stereotypes. The state has instead often helped to 
perpetuate and strengthen gender stereotypes, for example through the media that continued to project 
stereotypical images of women.” (“Scarred bodies, hidden crimes” Amnesty 2004:12)   
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2.4.6 The holy motherhood 
The social outlook on motherhood is another very influential part of the gender and abortion 
debate in Latin America. Marianismo, the female equivalent to machismo, is a cult of the 
“Virgin Mary” within the Roman Catholic Church idealizing motherhood and decorous 
behavior in women. Marianismo offer a belief that women are morally and spiritually superior 
to men and that childbirth give women a unique opportunity to fulfill God’s will, which have 
legitimated their subordination in the public and political sphere. (Htun 2003:31-32)  
In evangelicum vitae from 1995 the Pope acknowledges the tremendous costs the absolute 
ban on abortion has to Catholic women “who devote themselves to their families without 
reserve (…), and who are ready to make any effort, to face any sacrifice, in order to pass on 
to them the best of themselves. (…) We thank you for the sacrifice of your life.”  (Kalbian 
1995:123) 
According to Mexican feminist Marcela Lagarde motherhood is deeply conditioned by men 
and patriarchal states and disrupting the link between women and motherhood, which is so 
strong that also women without children are affected by it, is very important in the gender 
struggle. (Chant et al. 2003:13)  
Although over twenty years have past since the American sociologist Kristin Luker published 
her study “Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood” it has had a great importance for the 
abortion debate. According to Luker feminism has changed the way people think about 
abortion, as they started linking the availability of abortion to women’s opportunities in 
society. Abortion seized to be a strictly medical issue and became a women’s issue. When 
women accepted their primary role in society being a wife and a mother, control over one’s 
body meant little. But when women became part of the workforce they had different choices 
and they started to demand the right to abortion in order to control their own lives. Feminist 
mobilization against restrictive abortion laws consequently involves an attack on the 
assumptions on who women are and what their role in life should be. (Luker 1984:118)  
In 1961, a representative of one of the first pro-choice organizations in the United States made 
the following statement; “When we talk about women’s rights we can get all the rights in the 
world, the right to vote or to go to school, and none of them means a doggone thing if we 
don’t own the flesh we stand in (…), if the whole course of our lives can be changed by 
somebody else that can get us pregnant by accident, or by deceit or by force. So I consider the 
right to elective abortion (…) the cornerstone of the women’s movement. (…) Without that 
right we’d have about as many rights as the cow in the pasture that is taken to the bull once a 
year”. (Luker 1984:97) 
 
2.5 The theory of the Spiral model of human rights change 
 
2.5.1.  The Spiral model of human rights change 
To explain under which conditions international human rights norms from the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights19 are internalized and implemented domestically, and how this 
affects processes of political transformation in norm-violating states, the political scientists 
                                               
19
 The United Nations General Assembly established the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. It is 
not a binding treaty but a statement of principles. (Risse et al. 1999:1) 
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Thomas Risse, Kathryn Sikkink and Stephen C. Ropp have proposed a constructivist five-
phase model; the Spiral model of human rights change. Risse and his collaborators have 
analyzed eleven norm violating states focusing on the influence of two human rights norms; 
the right to life and the right to freedom.20 (Risse et al. 1999:1-2) 
When I started to read about the campaign to decriminalize abortion in Colombia I saw the 
striking similarities between my case and the five different strategy levels in the Spiral model 
of human rights change. Without knowing very much about the activism in Colombia I could 
see that they had been using international human rights arguments and different 
communication tools to affect the court and the public, comparable to the methods described 
in the Spiral model. In order to analyze how the women’s rights groups attained the 
decriminalization of abortion in Colombia I decided to use the Spiral model of human rights 
change. In the following I present a description of the model and its theoretical framework.  
 
2.5.2 The boomerang effect 
Governments are the most important “guarantors” of rights, but also their primary violators. 
When a government declines to recognize certain rights domestic groups often have no option 
within the domestic political and judicial arena than to go past its own state apparatus and turn 
directly to allies in other countries. (Keck and Sikkink 1998:12) The network can then put 
pressure on the oppressing state from outside, both from “above” (accusations from 
international human rights organizations) and from “below” (activities by domestic NGOs) to 
achieve human rights change (Brysk 1993 in Risse et al. 1999:18, 129). Keck and Sikkink call 
this the Boomerang effect (see Figure 1.2), as the opposition's arguments and requirements 
”bounces” back into the national policy, now with the surrounding world's eyes on the 
oppressing state. (Risse et al. 1999:18) 
 
Figure 1.2   The “boomerang effect” (Risse et al. 1999:19) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
20
 The investigated states are Kenya, Uganda, South Africa, Tunisia, Morocco, Indonesia, the Philippines, Chile, 
Guatemala, Poland and former Czechoslovakia.  
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The women's rights movement in Colombia also got international support similar to that of 
the “Boomerang effect”. Due to strong conservative forces in society, all earlier attempts to 
decriminalize abortion in the Congress or in the courts, had failed.  
In 2004, after many years of struggling, the women's rights groups got support from the 
Women's Link Worldwide, an international non-governmental organization promoting gender 
equality.  Women's Link had developed a vision of how to work strategically with the courts 
to promote the implementation of international human rights law and the advancement of 
women’s rights. Mónica Roa, a lawyer at Women's Link became the head of the initiative. 
Roa had carefully studied the Colombian case and because she had worked with similar cases 
of sexual- and reproductive rights in other countries she had many of the necessary 
international contacts. (Roa 2006:223) Women's Link International could also provide 
international economical support to the process.  
 
2.5.3 Model builds upon socialization process and “boomerang effect” 
The Spiral model of human rights change builds upon the earlier theoretical framework of the 
norm socialization process and the Boomerang effect. The Spiral model is more dynamic 
because it is made up by several “boomerang throws” where each throw describes the actions 
of the state and the transnational advocacy network throughout the path towards possibly 
improved human rights conditions.  The spiral model put in practice the process of norm 
socialization, identifies the form of social interaction in each phase; adaptation, arguing and 
institutionalization, and ultimately shows how international norms affect domestic human 
rights change. It is a theory of the stages and mechanisms under which the authors expect 
movement from one phase to another. Risse et al. do not presume evolutionary progress but 
identify an upward or sometimes downward spiral, through which international norms can 
lead to changes in behavior. Individual countries may get caught in or skip certain phases of 
the model. (Risse et al. 1999:18-20)  
The model is further based on the social structure of international and regional institutions 
which regulate human rights norms, transnational networks and national governments 
promoting these norms. International institutions include for most part the human rights 
bodies of the United Nations and the different human right treaties that have been ratified 
under UN auspices. (Risse et al. 1999:19, 21)  
 
2.5.4 The five phases of the Spiral model 
(Risse et al. 1999:22-35) 
 
1. Repression and activation of network. The national opposition is too weak in order to 
constitute a threat against the government. This phase can last very long since many 
oppressions never are to be noticed by transnational advocacy networks (TAN) if the 
network cannot find out sufficient information about what is taking place. The levels 
of state repression can vary greatly among the norm-violating states but is defined as 
“repression that is severe enough to disallow any serious opposition challenge to the 
state’s violation of international human rights norms”.  This is also the phase where 
the domestic opposition, if it is not too oppressed, starts to connect with transnational 
advocacy networks. 
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2. Denial of the state. The repressive state has attracted attention on the international 
agenda due to TANs work. TAN work along with the opposition to present the 
information that they then use for lobbying, moral persuasion and ”shaming” of the 
repressive state. The state usually denies all accusations and asserts its right to 
sovereignty. The fact that the state in this phase is feeling forced to refute the criticism 
shows that the norm socialization process has begun. But the denying can also be 
prolonged if the state is not depending on of economic aid or of the surrounding 
world's opinion. The more depending the state is, the greater is the possibilities for the 
network to succeed.  
3. Tactical concessions. The state is making strategic cosmetic changes to pacify 
international criticism and the transnational network is trying to strengthen the 
national opposition. This is a critical phase, because despite some international 
protection the opposition can be more repressed and this would break the upward 
spiral process, but it could also be stronger and more active. The state often 
underestimates earlier commitments and thinks that “talk is cheap”. They don’t realize 
they are “entrapped” in their own rhetoric, and that they are actually strengthening the 
power of the opposition. 
4. Prescriptive status. The arguments of the new norm are no longer controversial, but 
the state's behavior is still violating the norm. Internationally it is considered that the 
state has accepted the norm when it has ratified conventions that respect the norm 
and/or made it part of the national law, and if there are institutions where the citizens 
can report violations against the norm.  
5. Rule-consistent behavior. This is the final stage in the socialization process where it is 
assumed that human rights norms are fully institutionalized and that norm compliance 
has become a routine practice by all actors. The socialization process in order to attain 
rule-consistent behavior takes a long time, since it requires communication between 
many different operators. It is also crucial to have an infrastructure that can detain new 
norms, for example functioning welfare institutions. (Risse et al. 1999:31, 33) Only a 
few months had passed between the establishment of partial decriminalization of 
abortion and my arrival in Colombia in order to do this study. Due to the fact that the 
decriminalization of abortion is still in its infancy, it is not possible to include this 
phase in my study at this stage. 
 
2.5.5 Model for analysis based on the Spiral model of human rights change 
In this study I use the Spiral model of human rights change to trace the activities among 
involved actors before and during the policy process leading up to the partial 
decriminalization of abortion in Colombia. Can the different resources described in the model 
explain the partial decriminalization of abortion in Colombia? Are the resources in the model 
the only key to the achievement? Is there a unanimous testimony among the different actors in 
the process?  
The original model operates on four different levels simultaneously; transnational actors, 
domestic society, the links between the two, and the national government of the norm-
violating state. (Risse et al. 1999:17-18)  
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This works out well for the purpose of this study. But in order to sort out those aspects in the 
Spiral model that have been the most important for the outcome in my case, I have added two 
more features to the model: factors that have been either promoting or preventing for the 
outcome. What factors in the model suggested a partial decriminalization of abortion? 
Potential promoting factors can be the possibility for citizens to complain to state institutions. 
And what factors spoke against a decriminalization? One preventing factor might be the risks 
associated with being a political activist in Colombia.  
Accordingly, the tables below are based upon the original Spiral model of human rights 
change. The factors influencing the decriminalization of abortion in my case are the same 
factors presented in the original model. (Risse et al. 1999:20) My personal contribution to the 
model is the division of the factors in to either promoting or preventing categories.  
 
 
 
Table 1.1   Model for analysis based on the Spiral model of human rights change 
(Risse et al. 1999:20 with modifications by the author of this study) 
 
 
Model for analysis based on the Spiral model of human rights change 
 
 
Phase 1 
Repression and activation of network 
 
Factors influencing 
decriminalization of 
abortion 
 
State 
repression 
 
Weak 
opposition 
 
Activation of 
network 
 
Receive information 
from domestic 
opposition 
 
Invoke international 
human rights norms 
 
 Promoting factors 
     
 
 Preventing factors 
      
 
 
 
 
Phase 2 
Denial of the state 
 
 
Factors influencing 
decriminalization of abortion 
State denies validity  
of HR norms 
 
Pressurize 
 repressive state 
 
Mobilize international  
organizations 
and liberal states 
 
 Promoting factors  
  
 
 Preventing factors  
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Phase 3 
Tactical concessions 
 
 
Factors influencing
decriminalization 
of abortion 
 
 
 
Tactical 
concessions 
 
 
 
Mobilization and 
strengthening of 
groups 
engaging human 
rights norms 
 
Reduced 
margin of 
maneuver for 
the state 
 
 
Normative 
appeals 
 
 
Framing/Shaming 
(information) 
 
Human rights 
assuming 
center stage 
in societal 
discourse 
 
Promoting factors 
      
 
Preventing factors 
       
 
 
 
 
Phase 4 
Prescriptive status 
 
Factors 
influencing 
decriminalization 
of abortion 
 
State ratify 
international 
treaties 
 
State 
institutionalizes 
norms in domestic 
law 
 
State establishes 
institutional 
mechanism for 
complaints 
 
Discursive 
practice, 
dialogue 
 
 
Reduced 
network 
mobilization 
 
Promoting factors 
     
 
Preventing factors 
      
 
 
2.6 Alternative explanations and critique of the Spiral model 
 
2.6.1 Realist theory 
In international (neo-)realism the driving element of domestic human rights change is  
superior economic or military powers, such as hegemonic states or powerful economic 
institutions, for example the International Monetary Fund. According to this perspective the 
super powers intentions and actions towards less powerful states determine the states interest 
in human rights change. Whether norm-violating states respond to human rights demands 
from transnational advocacy networks will depend on if more powerful states enforce those 
human rights norms.  (Krasner 1993:165-67, 140-41)  
Risse et al. do not reject the neo-realist perspective but indicates that individuals and 
institutions within these superior powers already are to be found among the transnational 
actors in the Spiral model. Great power pressure towards norm-violating states is described in 
the boomerang throws of the model. Risse et al. claim that their case studies have proven that 
the pressure from great powers often originate from the lobbying and shaming of transnational 
networks. An example of this is the many years of pressures from transnational networks 
towards great powers such as the United States and Great Britain, for them to influence the 
South African government to stop the apartheid regime. (Risse et al. 1999:268-69) The 
authors of the model maintain that the neo-realist explanation would only be challenging the 
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Spiral model if super powers (and not transnational networks) were established to be the most 
significant factor to human rights change in domestic states. (Risse et al.1999:36)  
2.6.2 Modernization theory 
Modernization theory stresses the primacy of domestic factors, such as economic growth, to 
determine political change in a state. According to this theory economic growth will create a 
middle-class with higher educational level, greater access to the media and more knowledge 
in political affairs. (Hadenius 1992:78) This will increase the people´s demand for democracy, 
lead to political mobilization and stop human rights violations.  
Risse et al. argue that the theory that economic growth will lead to the implementation of 
human rights has been proven weak in many cases. Argentina is one example: with one of the 
best-off middle classes in the developing world it experienced the most brutal violations 
against human rights in the 1960-70s. On the contrary, many of Risse et al’s studies show 
how economical crisis in the norm-violating states turned to economic growth after the 
implementation of human rights. (Risse et al. 1999:269)  
Most importantly, both neo-realist and modernization theories lack the independent causal 
significance of international principled ideas and norms about human rights, that the Spiral 
model is built upon. According to Risse and colleagues realism ignores international human 
rights norms as a condition of changing interests of powerful states, and modernization theory 
only sees to the interests of the middle-class. (Risse et al. 1999:270)  
 
2.6.3 Critique against the Spiral model of human rights change 
The assumptions in the Spiral model imply that the model takes as given the relationship 
between international human rights norms and states, without exploring the reverse influence 
that the norm-violating state may have on human rights norms. Another point of critique has 
been the lack of discussion around what makes certain states pressure norm-violating states to 
comply with human rights norms (the boomerang effect). (Fleay 2005:40-41) 
Yet another critique, also in focus in this study, is the fact that Risse et al. do not debate the 
universality of human rights. They touch upon the issue and the implications of focusing only 
on core human rights, but they never discuss it any further. (Fleay 2005:42-43) In the Spiral 
model Risse et al. have chosen to examine the core right of the international human rights, the 
right to life, defined by the authors as the right to be free from extrajudicial execution, 
disappearance, torture and arbitrary arrest. According to the authors the right to life is put to 
the test in the model because it is the most accepted among the universal human rights. It is 
assumed that these rights have reached an uncontroversial status and are not bound by any 
particular political system or ideology. The authors believe that if the highly accepted norms 
of the right to life have not made an impact on the practices of norm-violating states, they do 
not expect progress in less consensual areas of human rights. (Risse et al. 1999:2-3) 
Risse et al. have been criticized for taking the easy way out as they have only studied more 
“traditional” human rights. Because the authors behind the Spiral model maintain that their 
model holds true for most of their country cases despite domestic differences, and because 
they have only examined core human rights, we do not know if the Spiral model is also 
applicable on other rights, for example women's rights. Caroline Fleay maintains in her study, 
using the Spiral model on human rights implementation in China, that further research of the 
model by applying other rights is needed. (Fleay 2005:41) 
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2.6.4 Applying a contested human right at the Spiral model 
Women's international human rights have proven to be clearly more contested and culture-
sensitive compared to the right to life, applied by the originators of the Spiral model.   Within 
the traditional human rights discourse there has been a clear distinction between violations of 
rights in the public sphere and in the private sphere, leaving domestic violence, sexual assault 
and illegal abortion out of the picture, since they for most part are carried out in the 
household. Not until 1993 it was laid down in the Vienna Declaration on Human Rights that 
women’s rights, including sexuality and reproduction, are part of the universal human rights 
and should not be subordinated to cultural or religious traditions.21 (Bergman 2004:54-55, 
Keck and Sikkink 1998:180)  
International human rights have for most part been established and interpreted by men and 
men have been the subjects of these rights. In addition, maintainers of women's rights are 
always at risk for being accused of cultural imperialism. All of this is especially true for 
abortion as a human right, which remains controversial even today. Thus, the socialization of 
women's human rights implies greater challenges for transnational and domestic advocacy 
networks. (Coomaraswamy 1997)   
Unlike Risse and his colleagues I have chosen to go one step further and apply this much 
more controversial human right into their theoretical model: the right to access to safe 
abortion. By applying a not fully accepted human right norm into the Spiral model of human 
rights change I hope to innovate and further develop the model. The motivation of my choice 
is presented in section 2.7 below.  
Many of the arguments used by advocates promoting abortion rights are based upon 
international human rights, including the right to life. Every year thousands of women loose 
their lives because of ill-preformed illegal abortions. Moreover, many human rights advocates 
point to the development of international human rights. Due to a growing activism of 
women's rights groups and the increase of women in political office women's experiences 
now have a greater impact on laws and policies. Harmful practices that have not been 
acknowledged before because of ignorance, silence or political reasons are recognized as 
violations of human rights. Genital mutilation and rape as a war crime are examples that have 
been accepted as crimes against human rights in the last ten years. (Sjödahl 2004:25-26)   
 
2.7 Why is access to safe abortion a human right? 
Few other issues cause comparable moral outrage and political polarization as abortion. 
Accordingly, whether safe abortion22 should be included in the international human rights is a 
burning question. (Bergman 2004:11, Htun 2003:142) International trends have shown a 
widespread, although not worldwide, evolution of abortion legislation from moralistic laws, to 
laws concerned with women's health, and recently laws based in human rights principles. 
(Cook et al. 2003:104-105)  The international women’s health movement has been very 
successful in seeking inclusion in their respective official country delegation at international 
                                               
21
 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on Human Rights 1993, UN 
Doc.A/CONF.157/23. Articles 18 and 38. 
22
 According to the World Health Organization unsafe abortion is defined as a termination of an unwanted 
pregnancy either by persons lacking necessary skills or in an environment lacking the minimal medical standards 
or both. (WHO/MSM/92.5. at www.unfpa.org/swp/1997/box15.htm) 
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conferences on reproductive health and therefore been able to facilitate the process of 
consensus between governments. (Maguire 2003:260)  
The pro-life movement on the other hand is also using human rights arguments, maintaining 
that democratic states need to protect the innocent fetal life. Lobbyists from the Vatican and 
principally American pro-life organizations are present at every international meeting and 
they are not unexpectedly loud critics to many of the recent international recommendations.  
(Htun 2003:151-152) 
 
2.7.1 Important international conferences and agreements about safe abortion   
Both the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in 1994 and the 
Fourth Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 requested governments to address the public 
health issue of unsafe abortions and to give safe medical care to women with post-abortion 
complications. The Beijing Platform of Action includes an important recommendation to 
review laws that criminalize abortion. (Bergman 2004:56) UN Plans of Actions, although not 
legally binding, have a tremendous normative importance. (Htun 2003:150) 
The Committee of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has concluded that 
some restrictive abortion laws violate women's right to life and discriminate women. The 
CEDAW Committee, monitoring the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, has requested states to evaluate restrictive abortion laws and 
to guarantee safe and accessible abortion where it is legal. (Bergman 2004:51-53) The 
Committee establishes that criminalization of a medical practice that only women need, such 
as abortion, is sexual discrimination and a violation of the right to equality. Besides, the 
Convention against Torture has discussed the withholding of medical care in detention, for 
example refusal to terminate a high-risk pregnancy, as a form of torture. (Bergman 2004:52, 
Cook et al. 2003:173, 351)  
 
2.7.2 Important court cases and international decisions on abortion 
The case I am studying is a unique case because it is the first appeal against a total 
criminalization of abortion to successfully be lodge in a Constitutional Court.  There have 
been previous cases of legal complaints against states where abortion is illegal, but those have 
all been cases of individual pregnant women. In 2005, an appeal against the Irish abortion ban 
was brought to the European Court of Human Rights by a pregnant Irish woman. In 2006, the 
court declared the case inadmissible due to the applicant’s failure to exhaust domestic 
remedies. (Center of Reproductive Rights´ (CRR) website) 
Several women, who have been refused abortion, even though it is legal within present 
circumstances in their country, have had more luck in the courts. In 2001 a Peruvian woman, 
carrying a fetus with a fatal anomaly, was denied an abortion. A complaint was filed to the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee. In 2005, the Committee established that denying 
access to legal abortion violates women's most basic human rights. This decision marked the 
first time an international human rights body held a government accountable for failing to 
ensure access to legal abortion. (CRRs website)  
In 2002, a Mexican girl that was raped and then denied a legally permitted abortion appealed 
to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, claiming violations of her legally 
guaranteed rights. In 2006 a landmark settlement was reached when the Mexican government 
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agreed to pay reparations to the girl and issue a regulation for access to abortion for rape 
victims. (CRRs website) 
According to the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights is the right to safe abortion, in 
the case of rape or a life-threatening pregnancy, a human right. (Bergman in Ottar No. 
05/2006) Amnesty International and the Human Rights Watch also state equitable access to 
safe abortion to be a human right. (Human Rights Watch website)  
 
3. Methods and Materials 
 
3.1. Methods 
 
3.1.1. A least likely case 
Despite the human rights oriented Constitution of 1991 the women’s rights organizations had 
failed repeatedly to decriminalize abortion. As mentioned earlier, there are many obstacles for 
the advancement of women's rights in Colombia.  
Firstly, the political history of the country is blood-stained and to work with politics or human 
rights in Colombia involves many risks. Political violence is used to ensure electoral outcome 
and to guarantee property right and economic power. During the last three decades the 
country has had one of the world’s highest murder rates. Although no reliable statistics exists 
it is certain that thousands of human rights activists, often accused of being guerilla 
supporters, have been threatened or killed throughout the decades of the conflict. One of the 
most vulnerable groups is women’s rights activists. (Tate 2007:31-33, 155)  
Secondly, a strong domination of the Catholic Church and a widespread machismo culture has 
further complicated the work of women's rights groups in the country, especially in the 
sensitive field of sexual and reproductive rights. Since the Catholic Church has been very 
influential in many Colombians´ lives it has also deeply affected the way people think about 
gender roles, sexuality and abortion. The Catholic culture honors motherhood and modest 
behavior in women. There has been a close relationship between the state and the Catholic 
Church also within the political sphere, making it difficult to overcome the conservative 
majority. Abortion has been such a sensitive issue that politicians were afraid to loose votes if 
they brought it up. (Brusco 1995:32-35, Htun 2003:31-32)   
To summarize, the difficult political climate, the dangers for human rights activists and the 
conservative society have not presented the most favorable conditions for the promotion of 
abortion rights in Colombia. Accordingly, I consider the partial decriminalization of abortion 
to be a least likely case.  
 
3.1.2 Process tracing 
To establish a causal link between a certain movement and an observed change is one of the 
main methodological difficulties encountered by social- and women's movements researchers. 
(Špehar 2007:80) How can we prove if the partial decriminalization of abortion was a product 
of the LAICIA network’s activities and international support or if it was the result of a 
modern legislation and an already present lax in the public debate?  
In my study I work with process tracing to build a chain of evidence linking the participation 
of the LAICIA network in the policy process to the effects of that participation. The key to 
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process tracing is to find out the priority of events and how the most relevant actors were 
thinking at different stages of the process. (Esaiasson et al. 2005:142)  
To develop a detailed analysis of the process I have worked with “process tracing”, which 
means “tracing the operation of the causal mechanism(s) at work in a given situation, by 
breaking down complex chains of events into smaller pieces and exploring the extent of 
which each coincides with prior, theoretically derived, expectations about the workings of the 
mechanism”. (George and Bennett 2005) That is to say, I scrutinized the activities of the 
LAICIA network before the decriminalization of abortion by breaking it down in particular 
episodes. I then compared each episode to the expected phases of the Spiral model of human 
rights change to see if it corresponds to the assumptions about networking and international 
support in the model. I do this by using both interviews and written documentation. 
Andrea Špehar, author of the thesis “How Women's Movements Matter” describes three 
different levels of perception that she examines in her study. First, she asked the 
representatives within the women's movement about their self-assessments of their influence 
on the policy process (ego-perception). Secondly, the author inquired the public authorities 
how they apprehended the impact of the women's movement in the policy change (alter-
perception). Ultimately, Špehar analyzes the policy process by looking into written 
documentation about the activities of the women's movement leading up to the policy 
outcome (supra analysis). (Špehar 2007:82) By means of this methodology it is possible to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the activities and to what extent the women's movement attain 
their initial policy goals. 
I have worked in a similar way, by interviewing participants in the LAICIA network about 
their self-assessments of their importance in the process, and by talking to state authorities 
and the conservative opposition about their perception of the LAICIA networks´ influence. 
Additionally, I consulted written documentation to understand how the partial 
decriminalization of abortion came about in the contradictory Colombian society. All of this 
information was compiled and fed into the Spiral model of human rights change to see if the 
model can explain my case.  
The process tracing goes from the end of 2004, when lawyer Mónica Roa and her partners 
first started working on the LAICIA project, until May of 2006 when the Constitutional Court 
gave its final decision. 
 
3.2 Materials 
3.2.1 The importance of the interviews 
From the very beginning of my research it has been clear that traveling to Colombia was 
valuable to interview the LAICIA network and others involved in the process about their 
participation. Written documents can give detailed descriptions of the policy process in 
question, but they can not substitute insights from key participants. Information from 
interviews with concerned actors can go beyond the official version of events to find hidden 
elements such as disagreements or other complexities in political policy processes. (Kvale 
1997) I first tried to contact the lawyer Monica Roa at Women's Link Worldwide in Bogotá, 
because I knew she had taken the initiative to file the complaint to the Constitutional Court. 
When I traveled to Colombia in October 2006 I also had a few names of other persons I 
wanted to talk to.  
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According to Andrea Špehar researchers that are examining the impact of the women's 
movement tend to rely too much on statements from representatives of the movement and 
overlook other actors in the process. Additional actors are a potential valuable source of 
information about the development in the process and about their perception of the women's 
movement’s impact. (Špehar 2007:82) Consequently, I have apart from interviewing the 
LAICIA network, also talked to public authorities involved in the policy process and to 
political opponents such as the Catholic Church and representatives of pro-life organizations.  
My interviews were semi-structured in the sense that the questions were formulated in 
advance and I posed for most part the same questions to all of my interviewees. But to keep 
each interview dynamic I sometimes added questions depending on the experience and 
knowledge of the interviewee and I allowed room for the respondent to expound her view on 
the process.23 (Kvale 1997:117)  
 
Selection of interviewees 
The selection of interviewees was based on the following criteria; 1) the person must have 
been involved in the process of decriminalization of abortion in Colombia, 2) and had to be a 
key person either within the LAICIA network, the conservative opposition or at one of the 
involved public authorities. 
At my first interviews I asked my interviewees for other people to contact and I soon phoned 
and emailed these people and organizations and asked if I could meet with them too. At every 
interview I continued to ask for others involved in the process, and this gave me a broad net of 
contacts within different groups. Women's rights groups gave me a list of all the important 
links among them, the pro-life organizations gave me a valuable contact in the Catholic 
Church and the state employees helped me contact their colleagues. After a few weeks of 
interviewing I stopped asking for more contacts because I discovered that many of the 
interviewees came with very similar responses about events or strategies, and at this point I 
felt that I had enough interesting material for my analysis. (compare Esaiasson et al. 
2004:288)  
I continued with my planned interviews, since some key persons had been hard to make 
appointments with. It was quite easy to schedule appointments with both the pro-choice and 
the pro-life organizations. Probably this was because they were keen to reach out with their 
message. But to interview state officials and priests, I tried to make contact multiple times, 
often through their secretaries who would ask me to call back again and again. Nonetheless I 
could meet everybody I contacted, except for a politician who said she lived in fear of being 
kidnapped for the third time.  
I carried out a total of nineteen interviews. Since the women’s rights organizations had 
initiated the process, drawn up the strategies and had experienced and studied earlier attempts 
I did the majority of my interviews with them. To balance the information I received from the 
women's rights network I interviewed the opposition: a Catholic priest and representatives of 
two pro-life organizations. In an attempt to verify facts and get the state’s point of view I 
interviewed a judge at the Constitutional Court (that participated in the voting on the abortion 
issue) and the Head of Public Health issues at the Ministry of Social Protection (which is the 
                                               
23
 An interview guide can be found in appendix B.  
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person responsible for the regulation of the courts decision). In addition I met two employees 
at the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman (Defensoria del Pueblo); the Ombudsman of 
Constitutional and Legal Affairs as well as with the secretary to the Ombudsman for Women's 
and Children´s Rights. I also interviewed the responsible for women and gender issues at the 
Mayor’s office in Bogotá. (Alcaldia Mayor de Mujer y Genero).  
 
3.2.2 Consent and anonymity 
At the time of each interview every one of my interviewees knew who I was, as well as the 
purpose of my study. In addition I had with me a letter in Spanish signed by my supervisor at 
Göteborg university. This was a letter confirming my status as a student, as well as assuring 
them that their contributions would only be used in my academic paper. The letter was signed 
by my supervisor and had her contact information, in case they had further questions. Only 
one of my interviewees decided to remain anonymous and to leave out certain parts of the 
interview not to affect her work, and of course I respected this decision.  
 
3.2.3 The interviews 
Most of the interviews lasted for about one hour, with the exception of one where the 
interviewed had to leave after only 35 minutes and half of the questions. I then learned to 
inform the interviewee before we met that the interview would take about an hour. A few of 
my interviewees talked for a very long time, about two hours, and because I wanted to know 
as much as possible I sometimes found it hard to know where to stop them.  Some of the 
interviewed told me at the beginning they had very little time (30 minutes or less), and then 
while our talk progressed they seemed to be in no hurry and the interview ended up to be over 
an hour long.  
At every interview I got permission to use a recorder to tape the interview. The majority of 
the interviews took place at the interviewees’ workplace. Usually this was not a problem, but 
in a few occasions, constantly ringing phones or colleagues running in and out were 
disturbing during the interview, and even more so when I listened to the tape during the 
transcription. At three of the interviews I was invited home to the person in question and this 
was of course more quiet and pleasant, but also more time consuming as I usually ended up 
staying long to have coffee and to chat. Except for the two interviews with Mónica Roa, 
which were in English, all of the interviews were performed in Spanish.   
 
3.2.4 Written material and other sources 
To obtain an accurate picture of the political history and the human rights situation in 
Colombia I consulted previous academic research, diverse country reports from the Swedish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and reports from a number of non-governmental organizations. 
For the theoretical framework I have used previous research within the field of transnational 
networks, human rights implementation and the Spiral model of human rights change. To 
explain the significant parts of the Colombian constitution and the relevant national and 
international legislation I have consulted previous research carried out by both independent 
academics and lawyers working in the field of reproductive rights. Finally, except for my 
interviews, I have traced the course of events in this case by reading press material, legislation 
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and regulations, strategies, lobbying material from both parties and a few letters and 
publications from different actors. 
 
3.3 Review of sources  
I have kept four principles of source review in mind during this study: my sources should be 
true, independent, current and not biased. All of my interviewees have been with first hand 
sources involved directly with the process of the decriminalization. I tried as much as possible 
to avoid second-hand information, by confirming its source or asking the person directly 
involved. (Esaiasson 2004:287, 304, 309)  
Even though all my interviewees met the criteria I had set up, the expert knowledge of the 
policy process varied among them. Depending on their occupation they had knowledge within 
a variety of areas: the judicial system, government administration, public opinion, gender 
issues and ethical matters. Consequently the interviewees gave rich answers to questions 
within their expertise while other answers lacked substance, or in a few cases proved to be 
incorrect.   
The interviewee can be considered an informant, if it is an expert or a witness to a certain 
process, or the person can be a respondent, if he or she is an actor in the process. The 
interviewee is then the object of analysis. (Kvale 1997: 219-220) In this study the 
interviewees have both of these roles. When asked about their basic understanding of the 
course of events in the policy process or the most important actors, the interviewee is an 
informant. When the interviewed person is asked about her own participation (ego-
perception) or the involvement of others (alter-perception) in the process, she is on the other 
hand a respondent. (Špehar 2007:84) 
I arrived in Colombia a few months after the decision to partially decriminalize abortion had 
been taken and it was still a burning issue in society. By this time the campaigns had already 
been going on for about a year and a half, and seemed to be in fresh memory with all of the 
involved actors. (Esaiasson 2004:310-311) 
 
3.3.1 Important to avoid biased interviews  
Since the persons I interviewed are engaged in a sensitive issue and many of them have strong 
opinions, either in favor of or against legal abortion, I was careful not to put too much trust in 
possibly dependent or biased statements. Many of the interviewees may have their own 
agendas, deliberately or not, to describe an event in a certain way. It was important for me to 
keep this in mind. (Esaiasson 2004:309-310)  
By selecting interviewees from different fields and trying to confirm doubtful information 
with other interviewees, I tried to avoid or to balance biased sources. I have been cautious not 
to rely solely on the LAICIA network, but to seek for additional potential valuable sources of 
information about the development in the process, as well as their perception of the LAICIA 
network’s real impact. (Špehar 2007:82) By choosing to interview state authorities I wanted 
to balance the strong polarization between those in favor and those against legal abortion.  
 
3.3.2 Written material 
When I consulted different sorts of documentation I was attentive to understand who was 
behind each document. In such a polarized debate it is important to be aware of the fact that 
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information presented as evidence may be manipulated to speak for one part in the debate, or 
that important facts may be excluded for the same reason. I therefore used documentation 
from the LAICIA network and their opponents only to describe their strategies or views upon 
the process. The information about the legal system or about abortion as a human right that I 
included in my study has been confirmed with information from independent researchers or 
international institutions.  
It has been difficult for me to gather drafts from meetings held by involved actors before the 
court gave its final decision. Before the LAICIA network made the complaint public all their 
preparations were confidential and very few notes were entered in the minutes. Although, I 
believe that the unanimous testimony from most of my interviewees about the different 
episodes in the process can make up for this deficient. 
 
4 Analysis 
 
4.1 Phase 1: Repression and activation of network 
 
4.1.1 State repression  
 
4.1.1.1 State repression in my case 
According to the Spiral model of human rights change the degree of state repression 
determines whether or not transnational networks can acquire useful information about human 
rights violations. A very oppressive government sometimes never becomes a target for 
international advocacy if there are no possible channels the national opposition can use to 
give information to the transnational networks. (Risse et al. 1999:22)  
A classical definition of state repression is “state actions manifested through official 
regulatory measures designed to discriminate grossly against persons or organizations 
viewed as presenting a fundamental challenge to existing power relationships or key 
governmental policies, because of their perceived political beliefs" (Robert Goldstein 
1978:xvi). Risse et al. define state repression as “repression that is severe enough to disallow 
any serious opposition challenge to the state’s violation of international human rights 
norms”. The authors admit that the levels of state repression vary greatly among the countries 
they have investigated. In the Spiral model they apply a broad definition of state repression, 
including both severe repressions bordering to genocide in Guatemala, and milder restrictions 
in the freedom of expression and assembly during the Communist era in Poland. (Risse et al. 
1999:22, 106) Following these definitions of state repression, I describe in the subsequent 
sections the restrictions in the freedom of expression, political corruption and oppression 
against women, which I found in my case.    
 
4.1.1.2 Discrimination against women 
Discrimination against women can be found at all levels both in the public and in the private 
sphere. Silvia Arias, secretary at the Human Rights Ombudsman for Women's and Children’s 
Rights in Bogotá, confirms that the situation for women in Colombia is very difficult because 
of an existing machismo culture that promotes domestic and sexual violence against women. 
(Interview with Silvia Arias November 20, 2006) Other women's rights activists agreed;  
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“In Colombia it is a problem to be a woman, and to be a poor woman is a double problem. And 
if you are a woman, poor and black it is the worst! It is triple discrimination!” (Interview with Sandra 
Mazo, Catholics for a Free Choice, October 31, 2006) 
  
Unwanted pregnancies are very common among Colombian women and girls, and due to the 
armed conflict sexual violence has increased. Despite this the state has not done much to 
prevent sexual abuse or to give proper care to victims of this abuse: 
“I think Colombia is a country of contradictions with two extremes; a very good legislation and 
a very bad compliance of the law. We make very good laws, but we are very alienated from what we 
are writing. The regulations about sexual and reproductive health are good and broad-minded. (…) 
The problems are at the level of execution.” (Interview with a member of La Mesa por la Vida y la Salud de 
Mujeres) 
 
“I believe that many women in Colombia don’t think they have the right to their body because a 
lot of them are in a situation of discrimination where they have a weak position. And a problem for 
those women that do know their rights and want to report domestic and sexual violence is that it all 
depends on the judges’ sensibility towards the problems involved. The judges still have prejudices and 
when it is about sexual violence they will ask; (…) How was she dressed? Why was she at this 
particular street at this particular time? If the women's movement in this country had not struggled for 
laws about domestic and sexual violence, there wouldn’t have been any, because the state doesn’t 
care. The Colombian state still believes that domestic violence can be resolved within the family, that 
it is a private matter and not a political or public issue.” (Interview with Clara Elena Cardona, 
Woman’s House, December 6, 2006) 
 
“A few laws on sexual- and reproductive rights have been changed for the better, but many 
legal experts still talks about sexual abuse with erotic undertones”. (Interview with Ximena Castilla, 
January 9, 2007) 
 
Before the partial decriminalization of abortion pregnant women and girls that had been 
raped, or that were experiencing health problems, were silently suffering with the approval of 
the state;  
“This is all about a public health problem, women are dying. And it is a social problem as well, 
because it is the poor women who have to pay with their lives” says Florence Thomas, professor of 
psychology, member of La Mesa and famous feminist debater in Colombia. (Interview with Florence 
Thomas, November 27, 2006)  
 
4.1.1.3 The abortion issue banned from the politics 
For a long time there was a repressive barrier to bring up the abortion issue on the political 
agenda in Colombia. Sandra Mazo at Catholics for a Free Choice24 advocates that the 
patriarchal construction of the state, the legislation and the political identity of Colombia has 
always made it very difficult to recognize women's rights: 
“In the 1950´s women's groups struggled for women's suffrage, so that women could have some 
access to political power. To break the cultural patriarchal paradigm in this country is very difficult. 
                                               
24
 Catholics for a Free Choice (CFC) is an organization for Catholics who believe that the Catholic tradition 
supports a woman’s moral and legal right to follow her conscience in matters of sexuality and reproductive 
health. CFC works for the use of contraceptives and legal abortion.  www.catholicsforchoice.org 
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(…) We have fought for a decriminalization of abortion for more than 20 years.” (Interview with 
Sandra Mazo at Catholics for a Free Choice, October 31, 2006) 
“The government is concerned about the international criticism towards Colombia for the 
violations of human rights in the armed conflict. But the women's issues have always come in second 
place; it has not been a priority of the government.” 
 
According to Sandra Mazo the government has not legislated sexual and reproductive rights 
because of their fear of the abortion issue: 
“The government knows that if we start talking about sexual and reproductive rights, they have 
to do something about the abortion issue. For them, everything that touches sexual and reproductive 
rights is abortion. That has also been an obstacle in advancing the legislation.” 
Colombian anthropologist Mara Viveros wrote in the mid-1990s a brief report about why the 
abortion debate had stagnated and abortion had remained a crime in Colombia. According to 
Viveros a lacking interest from the state and an insufficient capacity of the civil society had 
prevented the state from acknowledging that the total ban on abortion violated human rights 
principles. The participation of the political elite (the Liberals and Conservatives) in the 
abortion debate has been limited, since the political elite in Colombia only have engaged 
themselves in social demand susceptible of giving benefits clientelistas25 or altering more 
votes to them. Another reason for the low political interest has been that women from the elite 
and upper middle class always have had the possibility to have an abortion abroad or at an 
expensive private clinic. No political party has included the abortion issue in their agenda. 
(Viveros 1997:8, 11) 
However, bills to decriminalize abortion have been presented in the Congress since the 1970s 
by individual parliamentarians.26 These progressive parliamentarians have for most part been 
liberals, but although the liberal party is considered the most modern and secular, it has never 
been willing to take a stand for the decriminalization of abortion, afraid to fall out with the 
Catholic Church, other politicians or with the beliefs of their voters. (Viveros 1997:8)  
Ximena Castilla, a feminist lawyer, gave me several examples of congressmen that have 
cooperated with women's rights groups to prepare bills for the decriminalization of abortion. 
But when the Catholic Church pointed accusations against them many of the politicians got 
scared and withdrew their propositions. Castilla gets support from Florence Thomas: 
“Really, all these bills were filed very rapidly, before a second debate, by pressure from the 
church and the right wing sector, the most conservatives in the country. By this time the public were 
absolutely not prepared and every time somebody talked about abortion it was an enormous scandal!”  
Previous attempts to liberalize the law on abortion by proposing bills in the Congress have all 
failed, since the majority in the Congress is conservative and Christian parliamentarians. 
Those prior experiences from the Congress convinced Mónica Roa and partners to turn 
directly to the Constitutional Court with their appeal. (Roa 2006:221) 
 
4.1.1.4 Difficult situation for women's rights activists 
The feminist movement has had to adjust itself to the difficult political situation in Colombia 
and to work in the shadow of disappearances and killings of social and political leaders and 
                                               
25
 El clientelismo is a system of favors and favors in return, also called corruption, which is very common in 
some spheres of the political elite in Colombia.  
26
 A complete list of earlier attempts to liberalize the abortion law in Colombia can be found in appendix A. 
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activists. The general violence and the strong mobilization for peace in the women's rights 
movement have put the demands for abortion rights at the end of the list. It was the 
threatening situation in the country and the difficulty to “prioritize” among many different 
violations of women's rights, together with poor organization skills that stopped the women's 
rights movement from being an effective counterweight in the abortion debate. (Viveros 
1997:10-12)   
Clara Elena Cardona at the Women's House pointed out the political repression that makes it 
difficult to work for women's rights: 
“Every government in Colombia is more conservative and authoritarian than the one before. 
The civil society and the social movements are fragmented and there is a lot of insecurity about human 
rights. To protect these rights involves danger for many of its defenders.” 
In June 2005 the apartment where Mónica Roa lived and worked in confidentiality with the 
complaint to decriminalize abortion was broken into. According to Roa no other valuables 
were stolen but confidential documents and computers holding information about the 
complaint. About this incident the Centre of Reproductive Rights write: 
“It is an intimidation tactic aimed at silencing a lawyer who is working through Colombia’s 
legal system to secure women’s basic human rights.” 27 (Human Rights Watch Webpage) 
During their campaign to decriminalize abortion the participants in the LAICIA network 
became subject of insults and even death threats.  
 
4.1.1.5 Close ties between the State and the Church 
The close ties between the State and the Catholic Church in Colombia has been another 
obstacle to bring up the subject of abortion in the political sphere. The women's rights groups 
struggling for legal abortion have always had to work against the powerful Catholic Church 
and general societal expectations on men and women.  
“I believe that the only thing that the government is afraid of is the Catholic Church. And why 
all this fear of the Church? The Catholic priests are taking part in peace negotiations, negotiations 
that are still not terminated. In other words, the government is walking on quick sand. They were 
afraid of a negative response and for their diplomatic relations with the Vatican.” (Interview with 
anonymous activist from La Mesa)  
 
“In the Congress there are a lot of politicians that believe that abortion is a sin. Colombia is 
supposed to be a secular state but the Catholic Church is strong and other churches are very 
influential, especially in the education of children and young women. What will happen to 16-year old 
girls if they need an abortion, when it has been almost obligatory with a conservative outlook on ones 
independence and sexuality and when there is no sexual education?“ (Interview with Clara Elena 
Cardona)  
 
“What I do believe is that the Catholic Church has, or had, because it is clearly in crisis now, a 
lot of political power. The fact that they were always mediating the peace conversations with the 
guerrilla for example and they were always compromising on “we help you with this issue that is 
important for you government, but issues that are important to us like abortion (…) will be 
untouched”. (…) I think that was why it was so hard before to stand up and ask for a debate without 
their participation” confirms Mónica Roa (Interview October 18, 2006).  
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 hrw.org/spanish/docs/2005/06/22/colomb11205.htm, www.womenslinkworldwide.org,  
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4.1.1.6 State repression could not prevent exchange of information 
Previously state repression had prevented a decriminalization of abortion in Colombia, but 
this time the repression was not strong enough to put a stop to the process. Information about 
the restrictive abortion ban could be transferred out of the country and gained international 
support. Despite this, abortion was still a very sensitive issue in the society. When Mónica 
Roa and her organization Women's Link Worldwide first arrived in Colombia in 2005, to 
exchange ideas and opinions with others working with the abortion issue, they had to meet in 
confidentiality. (Interview with Mónica Roa)  
 
4.1.2 Weak opposition 
 
4.1.2.1 Women’s rights movement no counterweight to the Church 
According to the Colombian anthropologist Mara Viveros the country’s political culture has 
been an obstacle for the opposition to debate the abortion issue because Colombia lacks the 
tradition of citizen participation, mobilization and debate. It has been difficult for the women's 
rights groups to become a sufficient substantial force to be listened to and considered a 
counterpart to the official position of the church. (Viveros 1997:11-12)  
Even when Latin American citizens came to accept divorce they remained deeply ambivalent 
to abortion. (Htun 2003:6) Colombia was no exception. A member of La Mesa reveals that 
the women's rights movement was forced to choose between the legalization of divorce and 
abortion:  
“When the constitution was created in 1991 there was a debate within the Constitutional 
Board, where all of the political parties were represented. I remember that there was a discussion to 
try to do something about abortion. There were two discussions, one about abortion and another 
about divorce. The Church let us know that it was more probable that they allowed divorce than 
abortion. So it was said, “okay, if we can’t have both we try with divorce”, which was also easier to 
get because everybody was in favor of it. So we sacrificed the issue of abortion. We (the women's 
movement) had many meetings with the board and then in 1991 I remember that there was a feeling 
that new doors opened up and we said “let’s do something about the abortion issue” and nobody 
believed us and they all said “like that will ever happen!” A lot of people needed divorce, in this 
country there was no divorce and no real civil marriage. Thus, we went with divorce.” 
According to Mónica Roa, before the LAICIA campaign the argumentation ruling the terms 
of the abortion debate in the court, as well as in the public sphere, was the fetus right to life 
and the courts obligation to comply with the moral code of the Catholic Church. The women’s 
rights groups have reacted to the demands of the right wing, but there initiatives have not had 
any real impact. (Roa 2006:222)  
Ana Maria Torres at La Mesa describes the Colombians strong ties to the Church; 
“We are in the habit of believing, it is part of our culture since we were indigenous. The 
Catholic Church has lost some of its credibility, but this is still mostly an urban phenomenon. In the 
villages you only have three persons to turn to, the priest, the mayor and the police. Consequently, in 
the provinces people very much believe in the parish priest and the priests continue to have a lot of 
power.”  
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4.1.2.2 Weak sympathy in earlier rulings by the Constitutional Court 
The Constitutional Court has protected sexual and reproductive rights in many of its previous 
decisions, although before 2006 the court had always stated that the law criminalizing 
abortion complied with the Constitution. (Cabal et al. 2003:67) Earlier appeals had been 
rejected since the Court maintained that they had already decided on the issue on the basis of 
the presented argumentation. (Interview with Lenis Urquijo, Ministry of Social Protection, 
December 27, 2006)  
          “Between 1994 and 2000 the Penal Code could not be changed, so not until the year 2000 
when a new Penal Code was established it was possible to once again demand a decriminalization of 
abortion. But I also believe that the women's movement needed to gather courage to show that this 
was not settled yet.” (Interview with Karin Kuhfeldt, Human Rights Ombudsman, December 1, 2006)  
 
According to Mónica Roa, who carefully investigated the jurisprudence on the abortion issue, 
it could not have been worse for the women rights groups to work with. (Roa 2006:222)  
In a decision in 1997 the Court maintained that abortion should be prohibited when the 
pregnancy resulted from a rape, but it recommended a lighter sentence for the pregnant 
woman if she practiced an abortion. The judges referred to papal encyclicals, among them the 
Humane Vitae, stating that “giving life to a human being dignifies and exalts the mother”.28 
(Cabal et al. 2003:54-55, 67) This is interesting, because when the Constitution of 1991 stated 
Colombia to be a secular state the Attorney General explained that all laws that derived from 
the papal treaty were unconstitutional. (Brusco 1995:34-35) 
 
“I was studying how to work with women's rights in the courts and I was traveling abroad and 
learned about other cases in other countries, and then I came back and realized that all the cases that 
had been brought up about abortion in Colombia were based on papal decrees. Even after the 
Constitution, when the state became secular it was still about Catholic papal decree, so I thought 
there is something wrong here, where are the real arguments?” (Interview with Mónica Roa) 
 
In 2001 the Court found that judges can decide not to impose punishment when a pregnancy 
is resulting from a rape.29 Unlike previous decisions the court did not cite religious 
authorities.In each of the decisions maintaining a prohibition of abortion a minority of the 
judges has made vote reservations. These judges argued that to bring a pregnancy to term has 
important life consequences for the woman and “objectifies her as a mere womb without 
consciousness”.30 (Cabal et al. 2003:67-68)  
Even though the jurisprudence was conservative, the court’s decision to reduce penalties in 
2001, together with the vote reservations, encouraged Mónica Roa and the LAICIA network. 
The composition of the judges in the court by the time of the complaint, together with their 
obligation to comply with the jurisprudence and with international human rights agreements, 
made the LAICIA network confident to act in the Constitutional Court. (Roa 2006: 222, 227-
229)   
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 Constitutional Court, Ruling C-013 of 1997, presiding Judge José Gregorio Hernandez. 
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 Constitutional Court, Ruling C-647 of 2001, presiding Judge Alfredo Beltrán Sierra. 
30
 Constitutional Court, Ruling C-133 of 1994, Ruling C-013 of 1997, dissenting opinion Eduardo Cifuentes, 
Carlos Gaviria and Alejandro Martinez.  
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4.1.2.3 Difficult to reach out to a polarized public 
The women's rights groups also had difficulties to reach out to the public with the implication 
of a partial decriminalization of abortion. Florence Thomas often travels around the country to 
talk about women's rights and she thinks much of the ignorance is due to the rift in education 
between different sectors of the population; 
“You have one sector that is very academic, that knows the law, that can travel, that believes in 
democracy and in human rights, and then you have the other sector were people went barely three 
years in primary school. Therefore it is very difficult to work in Colombia. When I start talking about 
abortion people understand legalization and they think all women will have abortions! Sometimes you 
feel hopeless, they do not understand what you talk about, and there are things they could easily 
understand with a bit more education.”  
According to Florence Thomas there is no sexual education in schools, despite the fact that it 
has been part of the legislation for about ten years; “Little by little the sexual education in schools 
was taken over by the conservative sectors and the Opus Dei31 until it stopped all together.” 
Women's rights groups indicate that it was hard to make people understand the consequences 
of the total ban on abortion. 
“Before, in the traditional polls the question was always the same; “are you in favor of or 
against abortion?” Consequently 80 percent answered they were against and 20 percent that they 
were in favor. The same polls with the same answers have been repeated over and over again for the 
last fifty years”, says a longtime member of the women's movement.  
To pose the abortion debate as a dichotomy of either being solely in favor or against is 
unhelpful in reaching a consensus, when in reality nearly everyone agree that there are too 
many abortions in the world today, but that under certain circumstances it is a necessary lesser 
evil. (Maguire 2003:266-267)  
 
4.1.2.4 Weak knowledge and conflicts within the women's rights movement 
According to a longtime member of La Mesa there was a clash of opinions and a bad 
knowledge of the legal system within the women's movement in Colombia; 
“There was an internal discussion and a division. One group said that we had to go through the 
Congress, not the court (with the abortion issue). (…) And I also think that there was partly weak 
knowledge of the how to use the legal system effectively through high impact litigation. That is not 
something that we have used very much before in Colombia.”  
Clara Elena Cardona from Casa de la Mujer (Women's House), a resource center for abused 
women in Bogotá, points to the lack of resources among women's organizations in the 
country:  
        “We have too small financial resources for a legal investigation. Either we work with abused 
women in the field or we do legal work! Our priority is the work for the women.”  
Societal openness with responsive institutions facilitates network socialization and gives 
opportunity to reach out to the state. It is a very important key to human rights work. (Risse 
1999:262-264) In Colombia any citizen can approach the Constitutional Court or any judge 
with a complaint. All of my interviewees believe that it is easy to file a complaint, although 
some legal knowledge and some money might be needed; 
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“To file a complaint does not cost anything but a poor citizen can not do it. Only to travel to 
central town costs money and to make copies costs money as well. And you need to have some 
knowledge of the legal system” (Ana Maria Torres, La Mesa) 
 
“Colombia is a state governed by law and all citizens can participate in legal processes. The 
requirements to file a complaint are very modest; you can even send it to the Court by mail. But there 
is the issue of political insecurity. ” (…) (Interview with Humberto Sierra, judge in the Constitutional 
Court, December 15, 2006) 
 
4.1.3 Activation of network 
 
4.1.3.1 Support from international organization – the “Boomerang effect” 
In 2004, after many years of struggling to decriminalize abortion, the women's rights 
movement in Colombia got support from the Women's Link Worldwide, an international non-
governmental organization promoting gender equality through legal avenues. Women's Link 
had developed a vision of how to work strategically with the courts to promote the 
implementation of international human rights law and the advancement of women’s rights. 
On the basis of compilation of previous experiences from national litigation in different 
countries they had systematized the lessons learned by promoters of social change. (Women's 
Link Worldwide website) 
When Women's Link Worldwide contacted the national opposition with a fresh idea, and the 
necessary financial support, it meant a new beginning for the opposition. Women's Link and 
Mónica Roa had many contacts in the field around the globe, and through research they knew 
that the Colombian abortion ban was already recognized and criticized by international 
organizations and bodies working with human and reproductive rights. Women's Link could 
through their transnational network offer access, leverage and money to the national 
opposition. When the national opposition in Colombia got international allies it made it 
possible for them to put pressure on the state from outside, just like Risse et al. are suggesting 
in the “boomerang pattern”. (Risse et al. 1999:18) 
To try their strategies and accumulated knowledge Women's Link Worldwide decided to 
bring the case of partial decriminalization of abortion in Colombia to the country’s 
Constitutional Court as a pilot case. The objective was to declare the article 122 in the 
Colombian Criminal Code, that criminalizes abortion under any circumstances, 
unconstitutional. (Roa 2006:223)  
 
4.1.3.2 A process of strategic litigation 
The legal process initiated by the complaint to the Constitutional Court was a process of 
strategic litigation. Litigation in the public’s interest means to give legal assistance to persons 
or groups to facilitate their access to the legal system. In strategic litigation lawyers work in 
the court with a special case with the objective to create effects that reach behind individual 
interest and make a broader social change. (Interrights 2004 in Roa 2006:224) The objectives 
of strategic litigation might be, among many others, to change law or politics that violate 
constitutional rights, assure that the interpretation of certain rights is adequate or to create 
pressure or public debate to obtain social change. (Rekosh et al. 2001 in Roa 2006:225)  
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Strategic litigation can be of high or low impact. When there are strong reasons to believe that 
the courts decision will be favorable or when the aim is not so much to win as to put the issue 
on the public agenda or to change the terms of the debate, high impact litigation is often the 
choice. In the case of the unconstitutionality of the abortion ban Women's Link Worldwide 
and partners chose high impact litigation because they had studied the character, the function 
and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court and the international law on abortion. They 
estimated their chances to decriminalize abortion under extreme circumstances to be very 
good. (Roa 2006:225) 
 
4.1.4 Receive information from domestic opposition 
It is crucial for the transnational network to gather sufficient information of the situation in 
the target state to be able to put the norm-violating state on the international agenda. (Risse et 
al. 1999:22) To do this Mónica Roa moved to Bogotá in the end of 2004 to work full time on 
the LAICIA project. All the work was confidential for the first ten months. Not until 
everything was in place and the complaint was presented did the network start to work 
publicly. 
“Before that it was all private preparations, we prepared different kinds of strategies, met with 
people and did a lot of networking. La Mesa became our closed allied from the start, because that was 
the only forum that met regularly to discuss the abortion issue, and they helped us to reach out to 
other people.  We first went to reproductive rights and women's rights groups, but we wanted to have 
a network as diverse as possible, so we talked to the academia, the medical experts, journalists and 
politicians from different fields both in different regions and internationally.” (Interview with Mónica 
Roa) 
Mónica Roa met secretly with influential lawyers and even the mayor in Bogotá. Juanita 
Barreto from Mayor’s Women and Gender office explains; 
“There was a meeting with Mónica, Ximena Castilla (lawyer), the mayor and myself in June or 
July of 2004. Mónica explained her idea and the mayor was very supportive because her idea agreed 
with the health policies that our office was developing.” (Interview with Juanita Barreto, the Mayor’s 
Women and Gender Office, December 7, 2006) 
La Mesa started to travel around different regions of the country to meet other interested in 
the campaign and to learn how de criminalization of abortion hit towards women in other 
parts of Colombia. (Roa 2006:237) From there the network decided to explore the possibility 
to make a complaint in the Constitutional Court. The Women's Link, La Mesa and some 
different groups in the extensive women's social movement in Colombia started to meet about 
twice a month to come up with a joint strategy. (Interviews with Florence Thomas, Sandra 
Mazo and Ximena Castilla) 
However, not all women's rights organizations within the network agreed that they should 
only ask for a decriminalization of abortion under extreme circumstances. A network of 
organizations tied to the Campaign for an Inter-American Convention for Sexual- and 
Reproductive rights, supported the appeal to the court, but preferred a request for a total 
decriminalization of abortion. (Interview with Clara Elena Cardona, Women's House)  
 
4.1.4.1 Building a broad network 
In 2004-2005 the LAICIA network worked for over six months to identify and convince 
interested groups to connect to the campaign. They constructed the framework for 
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interrelations, information flows and diverse channels of communication, which combined 
digital communication with more conventional ways; events and personal contacts. Women's 
Link and other partners were trying to synchronize its agendas to do a joint campaign with the 
minimum in common that they all wanted to transform the article 122 in the Colombian Penal 
Code. Each participant represented his or her area of expertise in the campaign, both to cover 
all perspectives of the abortion issue and to separate the ongoing debate in each field. 
Women's Link Worldwide was responsible for the juridical part of the argumentation, 
Catholics for a Free Choice debated the moral and religious aspects and the medical 
community answered for the field of public health. (Roa 2006:239-240)  
Besides from international support lawyer Mónica Roa also brought with her important 
connections, tells Ana-Maria Torres at La Mesa; 
“This will sound harsh but it is the truth; Mónica is a young woman from the upper middle 
class, with status in the society. She may have connections with powerful actors in this society, 
connections that are very important in this country. This is a country where such connections are the 
difference between being rich and being poor. So from her position of power she could speak about 
the abortion issue.”  
“Mónica is a young, enthusiastic woman, and we could say, with good contacts within the 
Constitutional Court, because she is a lawyer from the Los Andes university, which is a very important 
university here. (Interview with Ximena Castilla, lawyer)    
The purpose of the network was an interchange of information on both a national and 
international level, but also to further elaborate a campaign of mutual definitions, actions and 
challenges. In the LAICIA network the different point of views and knowledge were 
transformed in to new initiatives and actions. Another of the initial objectives with the 
network was to show the civil society and especially the women's rights groups how to work 
strategically with the courts to endorse sexual and reproductive rights. (Roa 2006:240-242)         
Mónica Roa describes how the LAICIA network kept growing bigger and bigger; 
“Some people we met with confidentially before and others jumped on board as soon as they 
heard that we filed the complaint. Some others were a little suspicious that I was very young; they 
didn’t know who I was. But once they saw that my work was serious they came on board and it 
became really popular and everybody wanted to get on board. So it was like a snowball, really. It (the 
network) is actually huge, I couldn’t count the people that are now in it, have heard about it and feels 
actually personally engaged in it.” (Interview with Roa) 
 
4.1.5 Invoke international human rights norms 
 
4.1.5.1 The complaint to the court 
The complaint was filed to the Constitutional Court on April 14, 2005. In the complaint it was 
argued that the criminalization of abortion went against the right to equality and non-
discrimination (Political Constitution art.13). Roa and her partners argued that by 
criminalizing a medical practice that only women need and that can be necessary to save 
women's lives, women were deprived control over their bodies and their reproductive health. 
This discrimination disproportionately affected young, poor and rural women. (Women's Link 
fact sheet) 
According to the complainants the abortion ban had also severe effects on women's right to 
life, health and integrity (Constitution art. 11, 12, 43 and 49). Liberalization of abortion laws 
37 
 
reduces the rate of maternal mortality and morbidity and it is the only totally preventable 
cause of maternal death. In countries where abortions are illegal women experiences anxiety 
of acting clandestinely and are more likely to be psychological traumatized. (Center of 
Reproductive Rights 2005, Women's Link fact sheet)  
The plaintiffs further maintained that when women are forced to carry unwanted pregnancies 
to term it violate their right to dignity, reproductive autonomy and the free development of 
personhood (Constitution Preamble and art. 1, 16 and 42). When women can not have an 
abortion in the case of rape or severe fetal impairment or when the pregnancy goes against the 
women's physical or psychological well-being it means that women are treated as 
“reproductive machines” and deprived of the right to determine their own lives. (Women's 
Link fact sheet) 
 
4.1.5.2 Colombia ignored international recommendations  
In addition, Colombia had received multiple requests and recommendations by international 
human rights bodies to review its strict law on abortion. Since no measures to liberalize the 
law had been carried out by the state, a few of these recommendations were included in the 
complaint. In 1997 and in 2004 the Committee of Human Rights, which monitors the Political 
Rights Covenant (ratified by Colombia in 1969), called attention to the high mortality rate of 
women in Colombia resulting from clandestine abortions;  
“It is of special concern that women who have been victims of rape or incest or whose life is in 
danger as a result of their pregnancy may be prosecuted for resorting to such measures (abortion). 
The State party should ensure that the legislation applicable to abortion is revised so that no criminal 
offences are involved in the cases described above.” 
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, which monitors 
CEDAW, also expressed their alarm in 1999; 
“The Committee believes that legal provisions on abortion constitute a violation of the rights of 
women to health and life and of article 12 of the Convention. The Committee calls upon the 
Government to consider taking immediate action to provide for derogations from this legislation.” 
In that same year the Inter-American Committee on Human Rights pointed to how  
“The criminalization of abortion, together with the inadequate technique and unhygienic 
conditions in which abortions are performed, make it a leading cause of maternal mortality in 
Colombia. According to the State 23 percent of maternal deaths in Colombia result from poorly 
administered abortions.” (Zamudio, year unknown:13-14) 
 
4.1.6 Summary of phase 1 
 
Preventing factors 
As we have seen the overall human rights situation in Colombia prevented the women's rights activists 
to decriminalize abortion. The struggle for peace has kept the women's rights movement busy, and 
persecution and killings of human rights activists have silenced many.  
Another preventing factor has been that even though the state is secular since 1991, there is still a 
close relationship between the state and the Catholic hierarchy. State representatives have either 
refused to bring up the issue of illegal abortion or have withdrawn proposals because of fear for the 
political Establishment. Women's rights in general have low priority for the government. Due to poverty 
there is an enormous rift in education between people and the moral rhetoric of the Catholic Church 
have had a very strong influence on many Colombians. Consequently it has determined the public 
debate about abortion. In addition, within the women's rights movements the knowledge of the judicial 
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system has been low and it has been hard to weaken the cultural expectations on man- and 
motherhood.  
 
Promoting factors 
When the international organization Women's Link Worldwide contacted the national opposition it 
opened up new possibilities for a decriminalization. It encouraged the national opposition to see that 
illegal abortion is a concern on the international agenda, and that the Colombian state has ratified 
international human rights related to the issue. The state offered citizen access to human rights 
institutions were the LAICIA network could file its complaint. In addition, the Constitutional Court had 
defended sexual- and reproductive rights, although not abortion, in earlier rulings.  
Despite previous repression, the state did not prevent the spread of information about illegal abortions 
and the LAICIA network could create a broad network with many different experts. Women’s Link 
Worldwide provided international contacts, legal knowledge and experience and the necessary 
economical support. The national opposition was now able to put pressure on the state both from 
inside and outside of Colombia.  
 
4.2 Phase 2  Denial of the state 
4.2.1 Denial of the state 
This phase is characterized by the production of information about the situation in the target 
state, compiled by the transnational advocacy network in cooperation with domestic human 
rights organizations. The norm-violating government usually denies all accusations and 
asserts its right to sovereignty, i.e. refuses to accept the validity of human rights norms and 
that their violations are subject to international jurisdiction. The norm-violating government 
denies not just the charges, but the validity of the international human rights norms 
themselves and claims the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs. (Risse et al. 
1999:237) The denying can be prolonged if the government is not depending on the 
surrounding world's opinion. The more depending the state is, for example by earlier 
commitments to human rights, the bigger is the possibilities for the network to succeed. (Risse 
et al. 1999:22-24) 
 
4.2.1.1 Initial denial by parts of the state 
Although, during the campaign, the Colombian state never denied the validity of international 
human rights, it had previously for many years denied any correlation between human rights 
and the total ban on abortion. According to Karin Kuhfeldt, Ombudsman of Constitutional 
and Legal Affairs at the Human Rights Ombudsman, abortion was seen as a national matter;  
“The country has always maintained that the issue of abortion is a national issue and an 
independent decision made by this country. From the Human Rights Ombudsman we have at all times 
presented statistics about abortion and how it is handled in other countries. But regardless of this we 
had to consider that here we had an independent decision that we had to be responsible for, without 
being hard on ourselves. At least we were one of very few countries that completely banned abortion.”  
When the LAICIA network first presented its complaint in April 2005, the initial reaction 
from some state agencies was denial, although a majority supported the partial 
decriminalization, at least to some extent. While studying the complaint the Constitutional 
court requested concepts about the abortion issue from a variety of state agencies. Among 
these were the Attorney General (la Procuraduría General de la Nación), The Human Rights 
Ombudsman (la Defensoría del Pueblo), The Ministry of Social Protection (el Ministerio de la 
Protección Social), The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Justice (Ministerio del Interior y de 
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Justicia), The Colombian Institute of Family Welfare (El Instituto Colombiano del Bienestar 
Familiar) and by the National Academy of Medicine (la Academia Nacional de Medicina). 
(Interview with Lenis Urquijo, Ministry of Social Protection).  
The Ministry of Social Protection and the Institute of Family Welfare (ICBF) presented 
concepts against a decriminalization of abortion, maintaining the rights of the unborn child. 
(Interview with Ilva Hoyos, professor in law and chairwoman of the pro-life network the 
Future of Colombia., December 14, 2006) 
 
4.2.1.2 Mostly silence on the state’s behalf  
When the complaint became public and the official campaigns around the abortion issue were 
initiated in April of 2005 President Alvaro Uribe and the government neither confirmed nor 
denied allegations that the abortion ban violated constitutional rights. The government kept 
silent. 
“Fortunately, the process itself had more of a judicial focus, consequently the state 
representatives were quiet and waited for the court to give its verdict”, confirms Sandra Mazo. 
 
 “The Ministry of Social Protection supported the decriminalization of abortion, but they did it 
silently, not to come in an open conflict with the Catholic priests.” (Anonymous from La Mesa) 
At a previous debate on the ratification of the optional protocol of CEDAW, Convention on 
the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (eventually ratified in January 
2007) President Uribe did not express his personal opinion of abortion. However, he did 
comment that the ratification of the protocol did not imply any international obligation for 
him as a president to decriminalize abortion. He stated such a change to be the duty of a court 
or the parliament. (Interview with Mónica Roa)  
“The government would have preferred if the complaint was never presented” commented 
Juanita Barreto, consultant at the Mayor’s office in Bogotá. (Interview with Juanita Barreto) 
 
4.2.1.3 The First Lady supported the complaint 
Interestingly, the President’s wife Lina Maria Moreno was more talkative than her husband in 
the abortion debate. In October of 2005, in an interview for the Sunday edition of the national 
newspaper El Tiempo, the First Lady of the nation declared her support for a 
decriminalization of abortion within the three circumstances of the complaint. She criticized 
the fact that most of the women dying from illegal abortions are young and poor. In addition, 
she expressed her concern for the high teenage pregnancy rate and the suspended sexual 
education in schools. (El Tiempo Oct. 16, 2005).  
According to Clara Elena Cardona at Women's House Lina Maria Moreno also contacted the 
organizations involved in the campaign and showed her support. 
“But we considered that she was too involved with the government. If she wanted to support us 
it was better that she did so in public. In the campaign we didn’t receive any resources from her.” 
 
However, the statements made by the First Lady had a great impact on the general public and 
was of course very important for the LAICIA network. The pro-life network on the other hand 
was disappointed; 
“I think the government has been acting like a turncoat, the President expressed himself in 
favor of the right to life, but he didn’t do it as upfront and clear as the minister with the contrary point 
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of view, or like the First Lady. We were surprised that the First Lady showed her support so direct in 
an interview” said Ilva Hoyos from the pro-life network the Future of Colombia.  
 
4.2.1.4 Denial in the conservative sector 
Other parts of the state supported the conservative opposition. Within the church there were 
different views, some priests were completely against, while others were more open to a 
partial decriminalization. However, as an institution the Catholic Church declared itself 
against a decriminalization of abortion. (Interview with Juanita Barreto, Mayor’s office) 
Much of the Catholic Church’s and the pro-life movements’ arguments were characterized by 
denial and they were based on a rhetoric of nationalism and sovereignty. Non-governmental 
pro-life organizations saw legal abortion as a foreign threat; 
“There is a sector within the economy that has a strong interest that the world’s population 
does not continue to grow, so that the rich people stays rich. This is the depressing reality. So what is 
the idea? To abort! And who is deciding this? The Rockefeller Foundation and the United Nations. 
The Presidents has commitments with the International Monetary Fund and with the US, which all the 
time wants to see the Latin-American countries poor and inferior to them. (…) All laws that promote 
abortions are from abroad” say Olga De Villa and Estela Orozco at the Colombian branch of the US-
pro-life organization Human Life International. 
This argumentation also occurred within the state; 
“There is a conservative organization that has one representative in the parliament and in all 
debates he has maintained that abortion is a demand from multinationals that wants to decrease the 
world population” sights Karin Kuhfeldt, at the Human Rights Ombudsman.  
The conservatives and the Catholic Church started to campaign against the complaint. Full-
page advertisements about the importance to defend human life signed by several senators and 
legislators were published in El Tiempo. Behind the publication was Human Life 
International. (El Tiempo Oct 2, 2005) US pro-life organizations like Human Life 
International are affiliated in almost every Latin American country, including Colombia. 
(Htun 2003:152) Parts of the pro-life movement accused the LAICIA network of being 
financed by international death-agencies. (Sandra Mazo, Catholics for a Free Choice) 
Florence Thomas also indicates that the LAICIA network was insulted by parts of the pro-life 
network; 
“You cannot imagine the insults they said to Mónica and me, murderers and responsible of 
genocide and much more! Furthermore, because I am a foreigner that has moved to Colombia, it was 
worse and I was more exposed to this name-calling.” (Interview with Florence Thomas) 
 
4.2.1.5 First complaint was turned down 
On December 7, 2005, after the LAICIA network had been campaigning for eight months, the 
Constitutional Court turned down the complaint. The court claimed that it was unable to 
pronounce a sentence. In their rejection the court considered it to be the task of the judges and 
not the complainants to suggest supplements to the existing law, for example to allow 
abortion in the case of rape, severe fetal malformation or when the life or health of the woman 
was endangered. The court also criticized a weak connection between the demands in the 
complaint and the real content of the law. Moreover, according to the court the international 
41 
 
arguments presented in the complaint failed to show why the Colombian state should change 
its policy on abortion.32  
Mónica Roa believes that the first decline by the court might have been an attempt to win time 
or to distract the pressure on the judges; 
“But the decline was clearly not justified in terms of legal technically. And the proof is that 
when they gave the final decision they gave us exactly what we had asked for in the first place.”  
Only four days after the first complaint was denied, on Dec 12, 2005 the LAICIA network 
filed a second version to the court. 
“The court probably thought that it would take us about six months to correct the complaint, 
but we worked day and night to make the changes and presented it once more four days later!” says 
Florence Thomas. 
 
4.2.1.6 No more room for denial 
The phenomenon that Risse and colleagues call “World time” implicate that the existence and 
strength of human rights institutions have steadily increased since the 1970´s. Within the 
period 1973-1985 the international human rights covenants came into effect, new institutions 
like the United Nations Human Rights Committee were founded and transnational human 
rights networks and NGOs emerged. The influence of human rights norms spread rapidly in 
the world after 1985. However, these normative changes did not take place in all countries or 
regions at the same moment. In Europe no state has denied the status of human rights norms 
since the Greek military junta in the late 1960´s, while in Latin America the historical limits 
of denial were reached in the mid 1990´s. (Risse et al. 1999:21-22) 
The LAICIA network’s complaint was filed to the Constitutional Court in Colombia in 2005. 
The human rights norms referred to in the complaint had been institutionalized in the country 
already in 1991, when the new Constitution was created. The state had not only ratified the 
current conventions on human rights, but had also included them in the Constitution. (Cabal et 
al. 2003:57)  
Risse and colleagues believe that states are less likely to maintain in a prolonged denial stage 
when human rights norms have become increasingly accepted or if they are already 
institutionalized in the structure of the state. (Risse et al. 1999:24)  
Consequently, denying the validity of human right norms was not an alternative to the 
Colombian government, given the human rights commitments in the Constitution. The “denial 
of the state” phase was therefore short in Colombia. This time ratified human rights 
agreements were brought to the state’s attention by the LAICIA network, and due to their 
normative commitments the state became susceptible to persuasion from both domestic and 
international human rights network. (Risse et al 1999:24) 
 
4.2.1.7 Increasing support from state agencies 
When the LAICIA network presented its second complaint in December 2005 both the 
Attorney General (La Procuraduría) and the Human Rights Ombudsman (la Defensoría) 
supported the complaint. In their concept to the Constitutional Court they declared the total 
ban on abortion to be unconstitutional. They also stated that the total ban violated the human 
rights of women and girls and that a punishment was discriminating;  
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“I think it was very important because for the first time ever the Attorney General and the 
Human Rights Ombudsman, which form the Public Ministry, asked for the total ban on abortion to be 
revised. At two previous opportunities they have maintained to the court that a total criminalization of 
abortion is constitutional, so this was a significant advance.” (Interview with Karin Kuhfelt, Human 
Rights Ombudsman) 
Other state agencies acted in a similar way. The Ministry of Social Protection and the Institute 
of Family Welfare (ICBF), that at first had presented concepts against a decriminalization of 
abortion, this time turned to the court and asked the judges to declare illegal abortion a public 
health issue and to decriminalize abortion under extreme circumstances.33 
“The Ministry of Social Protection and the ICBF first presented useless concepts with errors, 
but then they realized that not just any lawyer can manage these issues and that they needed lawyers 
that know sexual and reproductive health and rights, lawyers that are familiar with the CEDAW and 
the Cairo and Beijing conferences etc! And then they presented very useful concepts in favor. I think 
this happened because now with the Constitution of 1991 it is very difficult to say no to human rights.” 
(Anonymous from La Mesa)  
The opposition confirms this, but has a different opinion on the reasons for the change; 
“By the time of the first complaint they were positive to our point of view, but in the second they 
had change their minds because of the strategies that the feminists and the abortionists used!” says 
Ilva Hoyos, the Future of Colombia.  
 
4.2.2 Pressurize repressive state  
Mónica Roa means that part of the strategy was to use international moral persuasion to some 
extent, both to show how abortion was dealt with on an international level and to make the 
court feel that the “human rights world” was watching. The roll of the international network 
affiliated with the campaign was to inform on a worldwide debate about sexual and 
reproductive rights that has been going on for more than 30 years, to point to the necessity to 
advance in the field at a national level. The national network on their part was encouraged to 
soak up the terms of the international debate, to investigate the state of the problems in 
Colombia and to look for solutions. (Roa 2006:242) The LAICIA network also published 
press releases in English and designed them to be of interest of the international media. 
(Interview with Mónica Roa) 
 
4.2.3 Mobilize international organizations and liberal states 
The LAICIA network contacted international non-governmental organizations and human 
rights bodies and these organizations sent interventions to the Constitutional Court in May-
July of 2005; 
“We got a lot of amicus curies filed by international organizations. They were all very 
interested in what was happening here in Colombia, also because I was using many of the strategies 
that I had learned from them.” (Interview with Mónica Roa)  
Among the institutions sending amicus to the Constitutional Court in Colombia, asking them 
to comply with international human rights agreements, were very influential universities such 
as Harvard Law School Advocates for Human Rights and the Lowenstein Human Rights 
Clinic at Yale Law School, together with a multitude of organizations such as Human Rights 
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Watch and RFSU, Swedish Association for Sexual Education.34 In no previous lawsuit had 
the Constitutional court received so many interventions.  
The opposition used similar methods. Any Colombian citizen can make a written intervention 
to the Constitutional court. Thus, the opposition compiled interventions and signatures by 
citizens and send them to the court to protest against a possible decriminalization of abortion; 
“We were surprised because when we introduced the possibility for people to send 
interventions we expected about 10,000 and we ended up with more than 1.5 millions! (…) It was so 
many boxes that we had to figure out how to transport them all to the court” says Ilva Hoyos at The 
Future for Colombia. 
Since the human rights norms referred to in the complaint were not denied by the Colombian 
state, the LAICIA network did not try to influence Western governments to put pressure on 
the state. Still, the international support and interest was important parts of the process, since 
much of the arguments in the complaint were taken from international law and 
recommendations. (Interview with Sandra Mazo, Catholics for a Free Choice)  
 
4.2.4 Summary of phase 2 
 
Preventing factors 
At all the earlier attempts by the women's rights movement the Colombian state had denied women 
the right to legal abortion even under extreme circumstances. In April of 2005 when the LAICIA 
network filed the first complaint a few state agencies sent negative concepts to the court where they 
defended a total criminalization of abortion. In addition, the government replied to the complaint by 
silence.  This first complaint was turned down by the court. Conservative politicians and the pro-life 
movement, supported by the Catholic Church, also intensified their campaign against a 
decriminalization. A few state representatives dismissed abortion as a threat from abroad, although 
during my interviews this opinion was mostly expressed by non-governmental pro-life organizations. 
 
Promoting factors 
When a second complaint was presented just a few days later, in December 2005, the LAICIA network 
got more support. It became difficult for the state to deny the international human rights they had 
previously committed to in national legislation. A majority of state agencies supported the idea that 
illegal abortion was a serious public health issue. Already in the first process the President’s wife 
openly supported the complaint in the media. International organizations sent supporting interventions 
to the Court. The LAICIA network never had to make liberal states to put pressure on the Colombian 
state, because Colombia already accepted international human rights.   
 
4.3 Phase 3 Tactical concessions 
 
4.3.1 Tactical concessions 
 
4.3.1.1 Colombia in the phase of tactical concessions 
In the third phase of the Spiral model of human rights change the norm-violating state seeks 
cosmetic changes to pacify international criticism. By making tactical concessions, and by 
that means no longer denying international human rights norms, the state hopes to gain 
international recognition. This phase is the most critical in the model because the process can 
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either strengthen the opposition and continue the change of human rights conditions, or lead 
to a backlash of the movement due to weakness and/or repression. (Risse et al. 1999:25)  
Occasionally states ratify human rights norms without fully accepting them or trying to 
comply with them. But if the norm-violating state has made this kind of tactical concessions 
at this point, it is more vulnerable to allegations by the growing domestic opposition. (Risse et 
al. 1999:248)  
As we know by now Colombia has ratified almost every international human rights 
agreement, but despite this the country is known to be one of the worst human rights criminal 
in the world. I therefore consider that according to the Spiral model of human rights change 
Colombia found itself in the tactical concessions phase when the LAICIA network presented 
its complain to the Constitutional Court.  
 
4.3.2 Mobilization and strengthening of groups 
At the beginning of the third phase the domestic opposition is often small and dependent on 
just a few key leaders. During the third phase of the model the international attention has 
strengthened and legitimated the domestic opposition. The activities are now transferred from 
the transnational level to the growing domestic opposition. (Risse et al. 1999:25)  
To succeed with the high impact litigation, aiming to influence the public opinion, it was 
crucial to include a communication strategy to go along with the legal process. (Roa 
2006:225)  
“The only people I had to persuade with constitutional arguments were five of the nine judges. 
But of course we also wanted to take the opportunity to change public opinion.” (Interview with 
Mónica Roa)  
The communication campaign towards the public was lanced thought both manifestations and 
through the mass media. The aim was to present abortion from a perspective of public health, 
human rights, gender equality and social justice and to procure an answer to the high maternal 
mortality. (Roa 2006:237) 
At the beginning of the campaign it was difficult to reach out to the Catholic majority of the 
population. People were very influenced by the Church and they were negative to the 
networks proposal. Sandra Mazo at Catholics for a Free Choice believes that many people 
through the network were promoting free abortion and that most Colombians could not accept 
this;  
“To them abortion was a moral issue, the woman who practice an abortion was committing a 
sin, she was a murderer and had to be excommunicated from the Church. During the process people 
started to understand little by little that our objective was to allow abortion only within these three 
circumstances. They also understood that illegal abortion was an issue of public health and social 
justice. We succeeded to transform abortion from a religious matter to a political issue, which I 
believe to have been the most valuable change in this process.”(Interview with Sandra Mazo). 
 
4.3.3 Reduced margin of maneuver for the state 
 
4.3.3.1 The state entrapped in its own rhetoric 
When a domestic NGO networks is fully mobilized and linked to the global human rights 
polity it can be activated at any time. A state that starts making tactical concessions often 
underestimate the impact of them and think they have greater control over domestic and 
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international processes than they actually have. States authorities believe that “talk is cheap” 
and do not understand that they can get “entrapped” in their own rhetoric. (Risse et al. 
1999:26, 21) 
Again, the concept of “World time” can explain much of this setup; Colombia followed the 
“World time” cycle and the state made most of its tactical concessions during the international 
“human rights norm cascade”, from 1985 and ahead, when international human rights spread 
rapidly. (Risse et al. 1999:27)  
Already in the late 1960´s Colombia ratified their first human rights covenants. During the 
1980´s the state continued by ratifying international agreements about the human rights of 
women. But the real change came about in 1991 when the human rights-centered Constitution 
was settling. When ratifying these agreements the Colombian state, like many other states, 
could not know then the extent of pressures they would face and the impact their actions 
would have in a new world context. (Risse et al. 1999:27)  
Mónica Roa believes that the court and other state institutions were taken by surprise when 
the LAICIA network filed the complaint and started its campaign;  
“I think they were mostly surprised because they didn’t know how clear and specific the 
international arguments were, not even the judges, I believe. The development of abortion as a human 
right has been so big in the last ten years that I am not sure many people knew about it. (…) They (the 
state) knew what they had ratified, but they knew it from the male perspective, like when you talk 
about the right to life for men. But how about the violation of the right to life when it comes to women? 
(…) What happens to women is that they die because of illegal abortion.”(Interview with Mónica Roa)  
 
4.3.3.2 Tactical concessions become real dialogue 
In the later stages of the tactical concessions phase the norm-violating state starts to take its 
critics more seriously and discusses human rights with them. This further strengthens and 
empowers the opposition. What began as rhetoric concessions have now become real dialogue 
between the parties. Faced with a fully mobilized domestic and international opposition the 
state no longer has many choices left. (Risse et al. 1999:28)  
In the complaint and during the campaign the LAICIA network argued that the court had to be 
consistent in their use of international human rights agreements. The network pointed to that 
if the state was going to take all the legitimacy that praising human rights gave them, that also 
implied obligations that were very clear. In addition, the court had used international human 
rights to decide on other cases and now the LAICIA network believed it was time to be 
consistent and to use them for the issue of abortion as well. (Interview with Mónica Roa)  
However, at this stage there was not so much dialogue between the state parties and the 
LAICIA network. The Constitutional court could not enter into dialogue before they had 
made a decision and the other state institutions were silent, waiting for the court’s decision 
(although they did send petitions to the court). (Interview with Sandra Mazo) 
 
4.3.4 Normative appeals 
 
4.3.4.1 “Shaming” the state 
The LAICIA network started to expose the state to a normative process of “shaming”. Mónica 
Roa describes how the vanity of the state became one of the network’s assets; 
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“Something we had to try to get on our side is that Colombia is a very “snobbish” country, 
meaning that we really care about our international image. We had the pressure of the international 
world looking at us and saying that this (the total ban on abortion) is a violation of women’s social 
justice and a public health issue. We were trying to use it here to show that the debate was already 
solved in other parts of the world.”  
Roa also believes that the Colombian state thinks of itself as belonging to a community of 
liberal states; 
“I think Colombia likes to see itself as protective of human rights, even if it is completely 
different what happens in reality. But at least on paper the decisions of the Constitutional Court are 
some of the most progressive in the world. The court is very well known internationally for being 
progressive and protective of human rights. Again, at least on paper.”  
The network started to portray the Colombian state both internationally and nationally as a 
reactionary norm-violating state that was not willing to comply with the human rights 
agreements they had previously ratified. The total ban on abortion was described as both 
uncivilized and hostile to women’s basic rights. It was brought to attention by the network 
that Colombia had one of the most restrictive abortion laws in the world and that authorities 
like the Committee on Human Rights had recommended its legislation to be revised. 
(Women’s Link fact sheet)  
Florence Thomas writes a column in the national newspaper El Tiempo and as a member of 
the LAICIA network she frequently brought up the abortion debate. 
“I often use international arguments, for example that a majority of the world’s population 
lives in countries where abortion has been prescribed in the law. Colombia has clearly fallen behind 
the rest of the world!” (Interview with Florence Thomas)  
With these sorts of statements made by the LAICIA network Colombia was expelled to an out 
group and not seen as a liberal and democratic state, something that most states resent. (Risse 
et al. 1999:27) Sandra Mazo at Catholics for a Free Choice reveals that La Mesa had 
complained before to the Colombian state, that it was slow and old fashion and had a 
legislation that did not correspond to the reality in Latin America. The state had ignored these 
appeals, but when they were publicly discovered not to comply with international agreements 
they suddenly became concerned. (Interview with Sandra Mazo) 
 
4.3.5 Framing information 
 
4.3.5.1 Public manifestations  
The 28th of September is the day for the decriminalization of abortion in Latin America and 
the Caribbean. When the LAICIA process started the Colombian branch of the 28th of 
September campaign was reactivated and manifested publicly on the 28th of every month, 
from May 2005 until the courts final verdict. (Interview with Sandra Mazo) The campaigners 
went out on the streets in different parts of Colombia distributing information about their 
work and wearing t-shirts with the following messages: “We are all citizens and have a 
saying in the destiny of our nation, why can’t we have a say about our own bodies?” Other 
slogans were “Neither the state nor the Church decide, my body is mine” and “For a free 
choice of motherhood”. (Campaign brochures)  
Clara Elena Cardona at Casa de la Mujer reveals that not everybody was happy with the open 
manifestations of the LAICIA network; 
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“We had t-shirts that said “I have had an abortion” and in an interview for Caracol 
(Colombian broadcasting cooperation) I told my experience and then I received threatening letters. 
But that is all part of the process.”  
 
“When we went out on the streets with posters people yelled at us; “Murderers!” The taxi 
drivers for example, they were furious! But I said “Take it easy Mister, because you will not get 
pregnant by having sex!” says Ximena Castilla with a laugh. (Interview with Ximena Castilla, ) 
The work of the national women’s movement, which operated from all corners of Colombia, 
was crucial for the spreading of the LAICIA network’s message. Different women’s 
organizations and individuals manifested to make visible the need for a decriminalization of 
abortion and to make political institutions understand the importance of the public debate. 
(Sandra Mazo)  
Clara Elena Cardona at the Women’s House wants to emphasize the courage of many of the 
women manifesting for the cause around the country; 
“The process was not easy and it was not just to approach the Constitutional Court. There was 
a great difference in the campaign between educated women in Bogotá and uneducated rural women. 
It was very difficult to talk about abortion for women from popular movements, for poor women 
influenced by religion and for displaced or abused women. It had a high price both socially and 
economically speaking for them, some of them were rejected by their husbands. For women that had 
never been able to make their own decisions, to one day stand up in their neighborhood and say; 
“Look, I am in favor of abortion, I wear this t-shirt!” was not easy.”  
Despite all of the manifestations from both the LAICIA network and the opposition, one of 
the judges in the Constitutional court, Humberto Sierra, denies that the court felt pressure;  
“The Court was the object of many manifestations from both camps, but we didn’t feel any 
pressure.” (Interview with Humberto Sierra) 
 
4.3.5.2 The mass media campaign 
The information about abortion that had circulated in the media during the last twenty years 
was in general presenting moral or criminal aspects of the issue, because the journalists were 
often consulting their sources within the Catholic Church. When doctors or politicians were 
asked about abortion they brought up the public health aspect, but without consistency or 
without ever taking position for a decriminalization. The LAICIA network wanted to diverse 
the voices authorized to speak about abortion in the mass media and to change the terms of 
the abortion debate. (Roa 2006:235-236) With Mónica Roa´s new proposal there was a 
chance for people to look at the abortion issue fresh again; 
“We framed the debate differently and not with a few options of you agree or you disagree a 
hundred percent, but with the possibilities to pick within a different type of positions.” (Interview with 
Mónica Roa) 
In 2004, Women's Link Worldwide turned to a communication agency in Bogotá called 
Brújula (compass) Comunicaciones, and the agency put together a general strategy of how to 
create a positive image of a the complaint to the Constitutional Court among the public.35 
From the first moment of the process the LAICIA network had prepared a broad network 
representing a wide range of their arguments related to public health, psychology, national 
law and international human rights. When they eventually presented the appeal and let the 
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media know about the content and the arguments, their point of view was already known in 
the public sphere. The mediation was planned at an international, national, regional and local 
level, trying to have a constant dialog with national and international organizations, 
academics in the field, the medical community and with influential people in the public 
debate. (Roa 2006:235-236)  
There were several important challenges linked with the media strategy, to make abortion an 
issue of high impact on the national agenda, to be able to handle the permanent and always 
risky public exhibition and its repercussions that media coverage will involve, and to know 
how to act towards the profound diffusion of ideas and positions around the issue of abortion. 
Already a couple of weeks after the first appeal was presented the media coverage had been 
constant and overwhelming, with columns, articles and interviews and the publishers opinions 
on the issue had been generous and approving. (Roa 2006:235-236) 
Both the LAICIA network and the pro-life movement used the mass media to reach out with 
their message. Women with different experiences of abortion told their personal stories in the 
media, often anonymously. Depending on the purpose behind the media coverage the story 
emphasized either the damage a certain woman had suffered from being denied an abortion, 
alternatively how much she regretted having an abortion. Clara Elena Cardona at the 
Women’s House tells how the media chased stories; 
“When we first started the campaign the media called us and asked if we had women that had 
had abortions or that had been victims of sexual violence. But the Women’s House has an ethical 
position not to expose these women, because they trust us.”  
Two human fates especially affected people. One of them was Marta, a single pregnant 
mother that had fatal cancer. The pregnancy had to be interrupted in order to give her 
treatment, but the doctors refused to perform an abortion referring to the current prohibition. 
Marta eventually passed away, leaving four children behind.  Another story covered by the 
media was about an 11-years old girl that became pregnant when she was raped by her 
stepfather. This young girl became the first person to have a legal abortion in Colombia. The 
girl’s fate captured many Colombians, and even though her case was known after the court’s 
decision it sky rocked the public opinion in favor of a partial decriminalization. The Catholic 
Church reacted by excommunicating everyone that had been involved in the decision to make 
the abortion, including the doctors, the girl and even her grandmother. (Interview with 
Mónica Roa) 
 
4.3.6 Human rights assuming center stage in societal discourse 
 
The campaigning paid off and the issue of abortion became more accepted in the public 
sphere. 
”As the issue became more and more popular, more and more people from the government or 
from the Congress and different political parties decided to support us. I thought it was going to be 
harder and I never expected so much support. (…) But on the other hand we also knew that of the 
many abortions that take place in Colombia every year, 95 percent of those are Catholic women and 
95 percent of  those are men that have know that either their partner or their daughter have had an 
abortion. So there was this double standards that I think helped to…I think they were somehow 
convinced in private but what we helped them to do was to feel more at ease to come out publicly and 
say “Yes, I support abortion in this cases.” (Mónica Roa) 
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“The Colombian society is very liberal in its actions, but very conservative in its hearts and 
minds.” (Humberto Sierra, judge at the Constitutional Court) 
Daniel Maguire, professor in religious ethics, also refers to this double standard in his study; 
He points to that in no South American country is the Catholic population less than 70 
percent. Yet despite the Catholic Church’s ban on contraception, sterilization and abortion, 
the average fertility per woman has dropped from over six children in 1960 to just over three 
children in 2003. As Maguire argues, it is difficult to believe that this development is due to 
voluntary continence from sex. (Maguire 2003:70-71) 
 
International pressure versus national debate 
All throughout their study Risse et al. emphasizes transnational activism. In this third phase 
the Spiral model presupposes that international attention has strengthened and legitimated the 
domestic opposition. (Risse et al. 1999:25) Although the opposition in Colombia was 
strengthened it is difficult to say if this was because of international pressure or due to the 
active debate within the country. Among the interviewees the opinion was divided;  
“The international influence was important. It was not enough only with the domestic women’s 
groups having an interest in the abortion issue. When the Congress started to discuss the CEDAW 
protocol it stimulated people and they became aware that we had in fact signed the CEDAW.” (Juanita 
Barreto) 
When I speak to Mónica Roa a year after the decriminalization of abortion in Colombia she 
says; 
“Actually, international attention was not as important for the outcome as we first through. The 
idea was that international attention would give us attention in Colombia, but instead it was the other 
way around. The abortion issue provoked a huge debate in Colombia, and then the international 
actors became interested. (…) Of course without international human rights agreements or the 
financial support our organization would not even exist, but that is not relevant, what is relevant is 
what we managed to do with the resources we had.” (Mónica Roa) 
 
4.3.7 Summary of phase 3 
 
Preventing factors 
In this phase most of the indicators promotes a partial decriminalization of abortion in Colombia, even 
if there still is severe mobilization from the conservative sector. They too are using all the means they 
have, the media, their contacts and intense lobbying. For the LAICIA network it is difficult to convince 
those segments of the population that are close to the Catholic Church, and poor rural women are 
under pressure for joining the campaign. 
 
Promoting factors 
In this phase the effectiveness of the strategies used by the LAICIA network becomes apparent, partly 
because of the state’s vulnerability to earlier normative commitments. The network is aware that the 
state cares about its international image. They also know that the Constitutional court has a good 
reputation of being respectful of human rights. The LAICIA network takes advantage of this and in 
their communication campaign they point to that the state is hostile to women’s basic human rights. 
The network also has good contacts within the media, although the pro-life movement also uses the 
media for its purposes. The LAICIA network argues that the court has used international human rights 
to decide on other cases and that this is the time to be consistent. The state finds itself entrapped in its 
human rights rhetoric. It seems like the state did not realize what ratified human rights conventions 
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would mean in a new world context. The communication campaign is successful and more politicians 
and parts of the public are joining.   
 
4.4 Phase 4 Prescriptive status  
 
Criterions for prescriptive status  
“Prescriptive status” implies that the actors involved in the process on a regular basis refer to 
the human right norm to explain and comment on their own behavior and that of others.  The 
state is accepting the human rights norms, even though their actual behavior still violates the 
norm. Risse et al. emphasizes that this is the phase where argumentative behavior matters the 
most. As discussed earlier, national governments may in their contacts with international 
human right bodies refer to human rights norms for purely instrumental reasons, for example 
to receive Western goodwill. Because of this the Spiral model has come up with the following 
indicators for when governments are considered to have recognized the validity of human 
rights norms, i.e. attained prescriptive status. (Risse et al. 1999:29);  
 
• When the government has ratified the respective international human rights 
conventions, including the optional protocols  
• When the norms are institutionalized in the constitution and/or in national law 
• When there is an institutionalized mechanism for citizens to complain about 
violations of human rights 
• When the government acknowledge human rights norms irrespective of the audience, 
do not reject criticism as “interference in internal affairs” and engage in dialogue 
with critics. 
 
If we return to the concept of “world time” we can see that most countries in Risse et al´s 
study, despite their many internal differences, attained “prescriptive status” during the 
“international norm cascade” between 1985-1995. Virtually all Latin American states joined 
the “norm cascade” in just a few years at the turn of the decade (1987-1992).  There is no 
evident reason for this, because most of the main human rights treaties have been in force 
since the mid-1970´s. Risse et al. believe that this synchronized achievement of prescriptive 
status and the ratification of human rights treaties may be less linked to a country’s domestic 
structure and history than to global and regional normative development. The authors also 
suggest another possible explanation; that norm socialization takes time. Not only shall all 
international human rights institutions be in place, but it is also a communicative process that 
requires engagement. (Risse et al. 1999: 31, 191) 
 
4.4.1 The State has ratified international human rights conventions 
 
4.4.1.1 “Prescriptive status” in Colombia  
I consider that by the time Mónica Roa and her partners presented the complaint to partially 
decriminalize abortion in April 2005 Colombia had already reached “prescriptive status” 
regarding universal human rights. Colombia belongs to the big group of countries that went 
with the “international norm cascade” and “prescriptive status” was formally reached in 1991 
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when ratified human rights norms36 were institutionalized in the national constitution and the 
state began to establish a few human rights institutions. Colombia has also ratified some, but 
not all, of the optional protocols belonging to already ratified conventions.37 A few optional 
protocols have caused a heated discussion, especially the one belonging to the CEDAW, 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women;  
“Conservative groups in the Congress, supported by priests and the Opus Dei did not want the 
government to ratify the optional protocol of CEDAW because they said it was the same as legalizing 
abortion. The women’s movement had to work very hard for the government to finally ratify the 
protocol” tells Sandra Mazo at Catholics for a Free Choice.  
The optional protocol of CEDAW was not ratified by Colombia until January 200738, after the 
partial decriminalization of abortion took place. Still, like many other norm-violating states in 
the prescriptive status phase, the government in Colombia continues to violate human rights 
on a daily basis. Accordingly, there is a big gap between prescriptive status and rule-
consistent behavior in Colombia. (Risse et al. 1999:30, 163) Sandra Mazo at Catholics for a 
Free Choice explains; 
“The Constitution is good, it is well drawn up. The problem is that the structure of the state, 
that violates human rights, is ignoring the Constitution. If Colombia would live up to what is written in 
the Constitution, Colombia would be the ideal of a country, the best democracy in the world.”  
Clara Elena Cardona from Casa de la Mujer directly points to how the government has been 
using the ratification of international human rights to make tactical concessions; 
“The ratification of international treaties before the international community is one of state’s 
“tools” used by the current government to somewhat manipulate international aid. They say “look, we 
are supporting and respecting human rights in our Constitution.” But in reality that is not true. It is 
always like that, in reality it is not the case.” 
Thus, looking at the general human rights situation in Colombia one can say that universally 
accepted human rights have been formally institutionalized in the country. But this was not 
true for the more controversial right to access to safe abortion, not even under extreme 
circumstances. In 2005 when the LAICIA network started to prepare their complaint, human 
rights had no meaning for pregnant women in Colombia with a risky pregnancy, those 
carrying a fetus with abnormalities or women that had been raped. The life and well-being of 
the pregnant woman was sacrificed for that of the fetus. As we have seen, this was picked up 
on by the LAICIA network who argued that the state violated constitutional rights by denying 
women abortion even under these extreme circumstances.  
Risse et al. indicates that the first steps toward “prescriptive status” are usually taken earlier in 
the spiral model, but then instead as tactical concessions. Just ratifying this or that human 
rights norms does not qualify a state for the phase of “prescriptive status”, but almost all of 
the countries examined by Risse et al. have moved from tactical concessions to full 
                                               
36
 With the year of ratification indicated in parenthesis; The International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights 
(1969), the International Covenant on Economical, Social and Cultural Rights (1969), Convention on the 
Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (1981), Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, CEDAW (1982) and the Convention against Torture (1987), Convention on the 
Right of the Child (1991) and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention of Violence against Women 
(1995). (Women's Link fact sheet) 
37
 For example the optional protocols of the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights in 1997 and that 
of the Convention on the Right of the Child Rights in 2005. 
38
 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/8_b.htm 
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acceptance. Through treaty ratification states ensnare themselves in legal processes where 
they can no longer escape. (Risse et al. 1999:248)  
In this fourth phase of the model Risse et al. expects a dialogue of argumentation and 
justification between the national government and the domestic- and international opposition. 
But it is also in this phase where the state starts to institutionalize new institutions to protect 
human rights. (Risse et al. 1999:30) The economically weakest countries are not the ones 
most sensitive to pressure, but those that care about their international image. Tactical 
concessions made by the norm-violating state in previous phases will probably lead to either a 
regime change or a process of controlled liberalization, moving towards the phase of 
prescriptive status. (Risse et al. 1999: 37-38, 247) As far as Colombia is concerned the state 
went with a process of controlled liberalization of the abortion ban. 
 
4.4.2 State institutionalizes norms in domestic law 
 
4.4.2.1 The Constitutional Court’s final decision    
After another five months of campaigning the final verdict of the Constitutional Court came 
down on May 10, 2006. Five of the nine judges had voted in favor of a partial 
decriminalization. The ruling C-355/2006 held that abortion must not be considered a felony 
under three circumstances: when the life or health (physical or mental) of the woman is in 
danger; when pregnancy is a result of rape or incest; or when grave fetal malformations make 
life outside the uterus unviable. It was established in national law that the state had to provide 
women within these three circumstances with voluntary access to safe abortion. The LAICIA 
network and their supporters were of course overwhelmed with joy over the court’s decision; 
“All Latin-American countries are in this struggle, or a similar struggle, to decriminalize 
abortion. But the achievement here in Colombia has not happened in any other Latin-American 
country like we experienced it here. It is really a historical conquest, because we have managed to 
leave the countries that criminalize abortion under all circumstances” says Sandra Mazo at Catholics 
for a Free Choice. 
  
But there were also some critical voices within the women’s rights movement;  
“We consider this decision a big historical advance for women, an acknowledgement for 
women’s freedom and independence, but we believe that abortion is a right. Most women do not have 
abortions because they are experiencing any of the three circumstances that permit legal abortion. 
Most women have abortions because they don’t want to have children, because they can’t afford to 
have children or because the father-to-be is married and wants to keep the relation hidden. These 
women will continue to seek up illegal clinics and they will continue to die!” (Interview with Clara 
Elena Cardona, Women’s House) 
 
“I believe that if the court hadn’t felt all the pressure from the conservative sector they would 
have taken the decision to decriminalize abortion in all cases. I think that, in accordance with sound 
political and judicial logic, the court chose to decriminalize abortion within the three extreme cases 
because it allowed them to stay friends with both God and the “Devil”, by saying to the women “look, 
up to now we have succeeded within these three cases” and to the opposition “we cannot continue to 
force women to carry deformed fetus, fetus that result from rape or that women die because they can’t 
have an abortion, that is not corresponding to human rights.” In other words, the court gave 
something to both parties.” (Interview with Clara Elena Cardona, Women’s House) 
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During the campaign for a decriminalization the LAICIA network had welcomed everybody 
to join, as long as they wished for some sort of decriminalization of abortion. But later in the 
implementation process conflicts between the urban middleclass lawyers and the rural or 
alternative women's movement came up. Accordingly, the fact that the network was a mix of 
persons of different nationalities and from various socio-economic backgrounds can be both a 
strength and a weakness. 
 
“It is very important for us to tell that behind this achievement are all women. At May 10th 
when the final decision came we felt a bit of frustrated because the celebrations took place with 
Mónica Roa and people around her at certain reunions, at clubs and discotheques. We went with them 
and congratulated, but we also had some reflections that the celebrations should be for all women, 
especially for those that had a hard time when they chose to participate in the campaign. This is not 
our celebration, it is theirs. We have some differences there. The celebrations took place at Parque 93 
(a famous park in Bogotá surrounded by expensive clubs and restaurants), so obviously no invitations 
reached women in poor neighborhoods. And those were the ones that protested the 28th of every month 
outside the court, those were the ones that came hungry. We have to give these women an historic 
recognition.” (Interview with Clara Elena Cardona, Women’s House) 
 
4.4.2.2 A process of controlled liberalization 
When I was visiting Colombia during the winter of 2006 the LAICIA network was proud and 
optimistic, while the opposition of course was disappointed. But there was also a general 
confusion in society about what was going to happen after the verdict. There was no 
information about exactly which conditions that permitted an abortion, the methods that 
should be used to perform it, which institution(s) that were responsible for the procedure and 
so on. The opposition tried to stop all institutionalization of the decision, while the LAICIA 
network waited impatiently for a regulation to be set up by the Ministry of Social Protection; 
“I think the government totally respect the decision and will try to implement it. The only thing 
that I still don’t understand is why the Minister of Social Protection hasn’t published regulations on 
how the law will be implemented. I have been away, but I know that at the beginning he was totally 
willing to put in place a regulation, and then I came back and he said he was not going to do it, and 
then, yes I am going to, and then no again… I really don’t know, I am trying to figure out what is 
happening.” (Interview with Mónica Roa) 
 
         “Healthcare providers are not sure about their obligations, what they can and can not do and 
how they can do abortions and women don’t know exactly what their rights are. There has been 
confusing speculations about the regulations in the media since the court’s decision.” (Interview with 
Lenis Urquijo, Ministry of Social Protection) 
 
“After the Court gave its judgement the pro-life network continued its campaign, although less 
intensively, and they tried to influence us not to establish any sort of regulations according to what the 
court had decided. The pro-choice movement also put pressure on us, trying to make us implement the 
decision as soon as possible because they started to see violations against women entitled to 
abortions.” (Interview with Lenis Urquijo, Ministry of Social Protection)  
 
The 11-year old girl, who became pregnant after she was raped by her stepfather, and whose 
case became known to the media shortly after the decriminalization of abortion, was the first 
person ever to have a legal abortion in Colombia. However, the LAICIA network and the 
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Ministry of Social Protection had to contact several state agencies before the state was 
confident enough to go through with the abortion;  
“The court’s decision is legally binding since May 16th 2006 and it states that no regulations 
are necessary for the decision to be acted upon. But without a clear regulation we will have problems 
like in the case with the 11-years old girl that was denied abortion by the hospital. The Public 
Prosecutor and the Attorney General had to intervene and order the abortion. The case ended up to be 
a public affair, when it should have been only between the girl, her doctor and the parents.”  
(Interview with Lenis Urquijo, Ministry of Social Protection) 
 
“In the case of the 11-years old girl I had to work all the way via supporters in Sweden to give 
her the abortion she was entitled to at the Símon Bolívar hospital in Bogotá!”  (Interview with lawyer 
Ximena Castilla) 
 
4.4.3 State establishes institutionalized mechanism for complaints 
 
According to the courts´ decision all public and private health care facilities in the country 
must provide safe abortion within the three circumstances established by the court. No health 
care institution can refuse to provide an abortion due to moral objection. An individual staff 
can maintain moral objection, but is then obliged to refer the woman in need to a colleague or 
facilitation that are willing to perform the abortion.39  Most of my interviews took place 
before the regulations from the Ministry of Social Protection had been released and it was still 
unclear where a woman entitled to an abortion could turn to if she was not provided with the 
procedure. A number of Catholic hospitals refused to perform abortions. Even though 
Colombia has established several institutions where citizens can report violations of human 
rights, for example the Human Rights Ombudsman, nobody seemed to know which one was 
responsible for complaint regarding abortions. From my interviewees I got a variety of 
answers; some suggested the Human Rights Ombudsman, the Attorney General, or the Office 
of the Public Prosecutor (Humberto Sierra, judge in the Constitutional Court), while several 
organizations within the LAICIA network, in the absence of a clear regulation, referred 
women to come to them or to directly seek out a judge that could adjudge an abortion in an 
hospital;   
“One of the reasons why a regulation is important is because now women don’t know where to 
turn if they need an abortion. It is not clear were they can complain. What is clear, and actually you 
can use it because there is no regulation, is that you can pay a claim by going to a judge and say “I 
am not provided with an abortion even though I am entitled to it”. And then the judge can make a 
decision and say that they have to provide it. Of course, this is a judicial procedure (…) and it is 
somehow scary for women sometimes. Hopefully, when the regulation is in place, there will be some 
kind of institution.” (Mónica Roa) 
 
“I recommend that a woman who is experiencing this legal process turn to the women’s 
organizations so that we can defend her and follow her case, make it visible and help her.” (Interview 
with Sandra Mazo) 
 
 
 
                                               
39
 Norma técnica por la interrupción voluntaria del embarazo IVE p. 13 
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4.4.3.1 Prescriptive status reached 
In December 2006, five months after the decision, a regulation was issued by the Minister of 
Social Protection. The regulation describes all technical details around a legal abortion within 
the three circumstances, everything from the psychological treatment of the woman to the 
different methods of abortion. The regulation builds upon the World Health Organization’s 
guide to safe abortion and emphasizes that the health care system in Colombia, in accordance 
with ratified conventions at the Beijing conference in 1999, has to provide women with safe 
abortion in the cases where it is legal.40 With that, Colombia meet most of the indicators for 
prescriptive status put up by Risse and colleagues in the Spiral model of human rights change, 
including some institutional mechanisms for complaints;  
“Except for the women’s rights organizations, that are monitoring this issue, a woman can turn 
towards her social security provider. The Secretaries of Health in every state or town are obliged to 
supervise the issue (…) and other institutions that have on their table to observe the respect for rights, 
for example the Human Rights Ombudsman and the municipality. What we have to do in a near future 
is to see how all of these institutions can handle requests for abortions in an effective way. Because of 
course it is not the same thing if a woman requests a voluntary operation that she can wait for five 
months or a year to have, or if she needs a decision about abortion within hours or a few days. The 
pregnancy will develop further and increase the risks for the woman.” (Interview with Lenis Urquijo, 
Ministry of Social Protection) 
 
4.4.4 Acknowledgement of the human rights norms in discursive practice  
 
Most of my interviewees believed that the state respected and tried to implement the partial 
decriminalization of abortion. Many within the LAICIA network considered the Ministry of 
Social Protection an allied in the implementation process, although some were more critical;  
          “Ha! Absolutely not. Eh…No, if the government took this seriously the Ministry of Social 
Protection should have made the regulations by now. (…) but I think it will come little by little and 
that is normal. In France, where I come from, it was the same thing, women that wanted abortions 
thirty years ago were treated like prostitutes, but that is not the case anymore, and the same thing will 
happen here and it is happening right now! (…) Here is this let-go mentality, while the Ministry is 
doing nothing people think they can refuse to do abortions. But this will change! This is like an 
earthquake for this country!  (Interview with Florence Thomas in the end of November 2006)  
 
“We can see that the Ministry of Social Protection is very engaged in the work to produce a 
regulation. They have done it silently, which I believe is the right way to do it. The Ministry can not go 
into an open conflict with the priests. This is a Catholic country where you can not do that” says a 
member in La Mesa.  
 
“The state waited silently for the court’s decision and when it came they just accepted it. The 
state in general said that safe abortion is a right and that we shall follow the international 
commitments we have made. But one part of the state did not accept the decriminalization and started 
a legal process where they tried to declare the decision invalid” explains Sandra Mazo.  
 
La Mesa had a dialogue with the government via the Ministry of Social Protection and they 
monitored their actions to implement the decriminalization.  
                                               
40
 Norma técnica por la interrupción voluntaria del embarazo IVE p.10 
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“I try to talk to the Minister of Social Protection every now and then, but it is not that easy. I 
also talk with the first lady. I provide them with information about the issue” explains Mónica Roa.  
 
“We have had a dialogue with representatives from both camps. (…) In general both of them 
understood that the role of the Ministry was not to promote or to oppose the decision, but that we are 
obliged to implement the court’s decision and establish and guarantee these rights. No matter what 
personal opinions our representatives have regarding abortion we are doing this and that is 
something that we explained in the discussions with both parties.” (Interview with Lenis Urquijo, 
Ministry of Social Protection) 
 
4.4.5 Summary of phase 4 
Because this is the phase where the final decision is made I am not dividing it by promoting and 
preventing factors, instead I look at each of the indicators for prescriptive status put up by Risse et al. 
to check if my case corresponds to them.    
 
1. The government has ratified the respective international human rights conventions, 
including the optional protocols.  
Already fifteen years prior to the complaint by the LAICIA network the state in Colombia had 
institutionalized the respective international human rights (indirectly) referring to illegal abortion in the 
national constitution. Despite this the state denied women the right to access to safe abortion even 
under extreme circumstances. Colombia had not ratified all pertinent optional protocols, for example 
the CEDAW optional protocol. 
 
2.  The norms are institutionalized in the constitution and/or in national law.   
When the state was brought before its obligation to comply with international human rights in their own 
constitution, it chose a process of controlled liberalization. In May 10th 2006 the Constitutional court 
gave its final decision, ruling C-355/2006 that is decriminalizing abortion under all circumstances 
demanded by the complainants. 
 
3. There is an institutionalized mechanism for citizens to complain about violations of human 
rights.  
Despite the state’s acceptance a national regulation with current rules and instructions was a quite 
long time in coming. This causes general confusion among health care givers and women and forces 
the women’s rights network to fight hard for the first abortions to be performed. The Ministry of Social 
Protection that issued the regulation experienced a lot of pressure from both complainants and the 
opposition before the regulations was published in late December 2006. Although no clear institutional 
mechanism is set up for entitled women to complain if they are not provided with abortion, instead 
women are directed towards a variety of previously established human rights institutions, insurance 
companies or women’s rights organizations. 
 
4. The government acknowledge human rights norms irrespective of the audience, do not 
reject criticism as “interference in internal affairs” and engage in dialogue with critics.  
The state acknowledges the new norm and manages a dialogue with its critics. A part of the 
conservative sector starts a legal process to declare the court’s decision invalid.  
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5 Discussion and Conclusions 
 
5.1 Can the Spiral model of human rights change explain my case? 
In the beginning of this study I posed a number of questions regarding if the Spiral model of 
human rights change could explain the outcome of my case. Despite the state’s appraisal of 
international human rights within the Constitution, Colombia was far behind most countries in 
the world regarding the general human rights situation and the right to access to safe abortion.  
I found it especially interesting to examine the partial decriminalization of abortion in 
Colombia using the Spiral model, because the human right I am applying to the model, the 
right to access to safe abortion, is not a universally accepted human right (although there is an 
international tendency towards that direction). I wanted to see if the Spiral model would still 
work when applied to a more controversial human right.  
 
Model of analysis based on the Spiral model of human rights change 
The model for analysis below is based upon the Spiral model of human rights change and 
each phase illustrates the development leading towards the partial decriminalization of 
abortion in my case. The factors that are described in each phase are ideal types and therefore 
it can be difficult to establish exact boundaries between them. In addition to identifying the 
occurrence of factors I have above all identified them as either promoting or preventing to the 
final outcome. In a few cases the same incidents in the process have been both promoting and 
preventing for the final outcome.   
I summarize each phase and compare the course of event in this particular case to the 
predicted course in the Spiral model. In the end I discuss my final conclusions. 
 
Phase 1 – State repression and activation of network 
Table 5.1 summarizes the most important factors of Phase 1 (see below). A characteristic for 
the first phase of the Spiral model is that the opposition is too weak and oppressed. This is a 
good description of the opposition in Colombia before 2005. The women's movement did not 
stand a chance to decriminalize abortion because of the conservative violent state and the 
cultural climate in the society. The state refused to bring up the abortion issue at the political 
agenda. But the repression was not strong enough to stop the opposition from reaching out to 
international allies, a prerequisite for a continuing development. (Risse et al. 1999:22) 
However, to avoid sabotage because of the sensitiveness of the abortion issue in society, the 
initial LAICIA meetings and preparations had to be confidential. 
According to the Spiral model the domestic opposition in Colombia is strengthen by the 
international support. They become part of a transnational network, the LAICIA network, 
offering knowledge, valuable contacts and financial support. Thanks to the knowledge and 
experience in the network, the domestic opposition discover another advantage; the access to 
national institutions where they can file their complaint. According to Risse et al. this societal 
openness with responsive institutions facilitates network socialization and gives opportunity 
to reach out to the state. It is a very important key to human rights work. (Risse 1999:262-
264) 
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Table 5.1   Model for analysis based on the Spiral model of human rights change 
(Risse et al. 1999:20 with modifications by the author of this study) 
 
 
Phase 1 
Repression and activation of network 
 
 
Factors 
influencing 
decriminalization 
of abortion 
 
 
State  
repression 
 
Weak 
opposition 
 
Activation of 
network 
 
Receive 
information 
from domestic 
opposition 
 
Invoke international 
human rights norms 
 
Promoting 
 factors 
 
 
Existing network 
• Loose national 
network 
• International 
support 
 
No extreme 
repression 
• Free flow of 
information 
• Access for citizens 
to human rights 
institutions 
 
Court’s earlier 
decisions 
• Defended 
reproductive 
rights  
• Reservations to 
abortion ban, 
lowered 
punishment 
 
Support from 
international 
organization – 
“boomerang 
effect” 
• Legal knowledge, 
experience 
• Economic 
prerequisite 
• Created a broad 
network 
• Mónica Roa was 
unknown to the 
public.  Mónica R. 
had powerful 
contacts   
 
Free flow of 
information 
 
Could refer to human 
rights norms in the 
complaint 
• International HR norms 
institutionalized since 1991 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Preventing 
factors 
 
 
Discrimination 
• Poverty 
• Sexual/domestic 
violence 
• Neglecting state 
 
Political barriers 
• Difficult to break 
patriarchal culture 
• Low interest 
•  Fear among 
politicians for the 
Catholic church or 
to lose votes 
• Abortion taboo 
• Conservative 
congress 
• Dangerous to be 
human rights 
activist  
• Catholic church has 
strong political 
power 
• Mobilization for 
peace a priority 
• Restricted access to 
court for poor 
people 
 
Catholic 
domination 
• In the media 
and the public 
debate 
• Low citizen 
participation 
• Earlier court 
rulings based 
on religious 
values 
 
Difficult to 
reach out 
• Rift in education 
• No sexual 
education 
• Polarization of 
debate 
 
Within  
women’s 
movement 
• Bad knowledge  
• Conflicts  
•  Not able to 
profit on state’s 
HR commitment 
 
Risk for 
personal safety 
or sabotage  
 
Mónica Roa was 
unknown 
to the public 
 
 
 
 
Human rights ignored in 
practice 
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Phase 2 – Denial of the state 
Table 5.2 summarizes the most important factors of Phase 2 (see below). The denial phase 
was the shortest phase in my study, since former tactical concessions made it difficult for the 
state to deny international human rights. Neither the state agencies nor the conservative 
opposition denied international human rights, although quite a few did not consider the access 
to safe abortion under extreme circumstances to be a human right. When the first complaint 
was presented by the LAICIA network a few state agencies denied that unsafe illegal abortion 
was a serious health problem, and the Constitutional Court rejected the complaint. When the 
second complaint was filed almost all state parties supported the complaint. Accordingly, 
compared to many of the countries in the study carried out by Risse et al. the denial phase in 
this case was very brief.  
Some conservative politicians and the pro-life movement, supported by the Catholic Church, 
on the other hand acted like Risse and colleagues foresaw and dismissed the demand for legal 
abortion as foreign threat to national sovereignty and culture.  
Risse et al. also point to how the vanity of norm-violating states can make them eager to 
comply with human rights. The Constitutional Court received many petitions from famous 
international universities and human rights organizations supporting the demand for legal 
abortion. Many of my interviewees meant that the Colombian state saw itself as liberal and 
human rights oriented and that a total ban on abortion especially affecting sick, poor and 
raped women did not agree with that image. When the LAICIA network started to put both 
international and domestic pressure on the oppressing state their arguments and requirements 
”bounced” back into the national policy, now with the surrounding world's eyes on the state. 
Here we can see the Boomerang effect: as anticipated it was an important part of the process 
as it made the Colombian state institutions eager to comply with international human rights. 
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Table 5.2   Model for analysis based on the Spiral model of human rights change 
(Risse et al. 1999:20 with modifications by the author of this study) 
 
 
Phase 2 
Denial of the state 
 
 
Factors influencing 
decriminalization of 
abortion 
 
State denies validity 
of HR norms 
 
Pressurize repressive state 
 
Mobilize international 
organizations 
and liberal states 
 
 Promoting factors 
 
 
No room for denial 
• International human 
rights 
part of Constitution 
since 1991 
• Human rights 
institutions 
• Many state agencies 
supported complaint 
• President’s wife 
supportive 
 
 
International 
recommendations 
 
Supporting interventions to  
the court from international 
organizations and  
universities 
 
Published press releases  
in English 
 
Supporting interventions to 
the court 
• From international 
organizations, universities 
• No mobilization of liberal states 
was needed 
 
 Preventing factors 
 
 
State agencies silent, 
afraid of Church 
 
Initial denial by two 
state agencies 
 
Conservative denial  
• Conservative politicians 
denied 
• Conservative opposition 
started campaign 
 
First complaint 
turned down 
  
Interventions to the court 
from conservative 
opposition 
 
61 
 
Phase 3 – Tactical concessions  
Table 5.3 summarizes the most important factors of Phase 3 (see below). According to the 
Spiral model this is the most critical phase in the model because it can either strengthen the 
opposition or lead to a backlash of the movement due to repression. But if the norm-violating 
state has made tactical concessions in earlier phases it is more vulnerable to allegations by the 
growing domestic opposition. (Risse et al. 1999:25, 248)  
Colombia found itself in the third phase when the process to decriminalize abortion first 
started, and just as Risse and colleagues predict the Colombian state was vulnerable because 
of earlier normative commitments. The LAICIA network was aware of this vulnerability and 
used a lot of normative appeals in their communication campaign, by “shaming” the state both 
within and outside of the country. They were also careful to frame the issue of illegal abortion 
as a public health problem. The communication campaign was successful and consequently, 
the state found itself entrapped in its own human rights rhetoric.  
Argumentation and justification are the most important modes of action in this phase. The 
activities are now transferred from the transnational level to the growing domestic opposition, 
as predicted by the model. (Risse et al. 1999:25) But unlike most cases in the Spiral model 
(with apartheid in South Africa as the most evident example) the activity to decriminalize 
abortion in Colombia was relatively limited on an international level, although a number of 
international petitions were sent to the court. From the start this was above all a national issue 
and the debate was very vivid within the country, even though international human rights 
were a substantial part of the debate. But outside of Colombia, especially among people that 
are not directly involved in sexual- and reproductive health issues, there was little knowledge 
of what was going on. 
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Table 5.3   Model for analysis based on the Spiral model of human rights change 
(Risse et al. 1999:20 with modifications by the author of this study) 
 
 
Phase 3 
Tactical concessions 
 
 
Factors 
influencing 
decriminalization 
of abortion 
 
 
 
Tactical 
concessions 
 
Mobilization 
and 
strengthening 
of groups 
engaging 
human rights 
norms 
 
Reduced 
margin of 
maneuver 
for the state 
 
 
Normative 
appeals 
and  
“Shaming” 
 
 
Framing 
information 
 
Human rights 
assuming center 
stage 
in societal 
discourse 
 
Promoting 
factors 
 
 
Vulnerable 
state  
• Earlier human 
rights 
commitments 
 
Increased 
awareness of 
state’s earlier 
HR 
commitments 
 
Self-
entrapment 
• State believes 
talk is cheap 
• State don’t 
realize what 
HR 
commitments 
mean in new 
world context 
• State only 
knew human 
rights from a 
male 
perspective 
 
Effective 
because; 
• State cares 
about its 
international 
image  
• State sees 
itself as 
respectful of 
HR 
 
Shaming  
• LAICIA 
network 
describe 
state as 
hostile to 
women’s HR  
 
Court has 
used HR 
arguments 
in earlier 
rulings 
• LAICIA 
argue court 
has to be 
consistent 
 
Framing 
• Present 
abortion as 
matter of 
public health, 
HR, equality 
issue 
• Answer to high 
maternal 
mortality 
 
• Media 
• Good contacts 
within the 
media 
• Changed 
debate in 
media 
• Effective 
communicatio
n campaign 
led by 
advertising 
agency 
• Real life 
stories affect 
people 
 
 
Growing network 
• More people join 
network 
• Double standards in 
population 
• Politicians become 
more supportive 
 
Preventing 
factors 
 
 
 
  
 
• Limited 
dialogue with 
state parties, 
everybody 
had to wait for 
court decision  
 
Opposition 
also 
maintain 
normative 
appeals 
 
Opposition 
also put 
pressure on 
state 
 
Are also 
using media 
to some 
extent 
• appeals 
• stories 
Difficult to make 
people join 
• Think network 
support free abortion 
• Still heavy Catholic 
influence 
• Poor rural women 
had to pay high price 
for joining  
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Phase 4 – Prescriptive status 
Table 5.4 summarizes the most important factors of Phase 4 (see below). At the end of the 
process the state was subjected to normative pressure both from the LAICIA network and 
from other state parties. The court chose to partially decriminalize abortion and consequently 
began a controlled process of liberalization, which is one of the alternatives that Risse et al. 
expect in this phase.    
Because abortion was partially decriminalized in national law, the decision was respected by 
most of the state parties, a detailed regulation was eventually published and the state 
maintained dialogue with its critics, I consider that prescriptive status was obtained at the end 
of this process. (Compare Risse et al. 1999: 29) Although, there is one possible exception; 
there was no clear institutionalized mechanism for women to complain if they were not 
provided with an abortion they were entitled to. At least this was still the case by the time I 
finished my study in January of 2007.  
 
Table 5.4   Model for analysis based on the Spiral model of human rights change 
(Risse et al. 1999:20 with modifications by the author of this study) 
 
 
Phase 4  
Prescriptive status 
 
 
Factors 
influencing 
decriminalization 
of abortion 
 
 
State ratify 
international 
treaties 
 
State 
institutionalizes 
norms in domestic 
law 
 
State establishes 
institutional 
mechanism for 
complaints 
 
Acknowledgement in 
discursive practice, 
dialogue 
 
 
Promoting factors 
 
 
State has ratified 
all treaties and 
some optional 
protocols 
 
Legal abortion within 
three cases since 
May 2006 
 
 
State accepts the 
decision 
 
State engages in 
dialogue with all parties 
 
Preventing factors 
 
 
Heated discussion 
about CEDAW 
optional protocol 
 
Opposition tries to 
declare decision 
invalid  
 
No regulations 
before December 
2006  
Leads to confusion 
about current rules 
 
 
The main findings of my study 
Researchers like Radikha Coomaraswamy means that the socialization of women's human 
rights implies greater challenges for transnational and domestic advocacy networks. 
(Coomaraswamy 1997)  I have not seen any major difficulties in applying a contested human 
right like the right to access to safe abortion to the Spiral model of human rights change. The 
process of decriminalizing abortion in Colombia has been similar to the process of human 
rights change described in the Spiral model.  
In each of the phases the LAICIA network used many of the techniques that are suggested in 
the Spiral model, for example international networking and normative appeals to influence the 
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state. It seems like Risse and his colleagues have a good point when they maintain that the 
Spiral model can be applied to different countries going through human rights changes, 
regardless of the political or structural situation in the individual country.  
Despite this I believe that the LAICIA network was met with more resistance by the public 
when they promoted legal abortion, than they would have if they were endorsing a stop to 
torture, a recognized human right. It was not until the end of the campaign, or even after the 
court’s decision came down, when the cruel fate of the 11-year old girl and the dying mother 
of four became known, that the public opinion swung drastically towards a decriminalization. 
 
The short denial phase 
I have also found a few other interesting differences between my case and the Spiral model. 
The first thing that strikes me is the short denial phase. Because Colombia already found itself 
in the third phase of the Spiral model the state had made tactical concessions by 
acknowledging international human rights. There was no room for denial at this stage. More 
surprisingly, there was not very much denial among the representatives from the conservative 
opposition either. I believe that the LAICIA network made a tactical choice when they 
pointed to that Colombia is a secular state and that religious arguments did not belong to the 
debate.  This consequently cut off the oppositions´ chance of denial.  
Another thing I must take into consideration is the timing of my interviews. When I did my 
interviews the court had come down with its decision and some of my interviewees may, in 
the light of this new situation, have changed their argumentation. The representatives of the 
pro-life organizations I talked to expressed some of the denial that Risse et al. expect in the 
model. The Catholic bishop I interviewed had a much more humble attitude, saying that 
neither the church nor the state could decide if a woman should have an abortion, but that 
each person had to listen to its own heart. (Interview with Bishop Marulanda) According to 
lawyer Ximena Castilla this is a new rhetoric by the church;  
“This attitude that the church has now is very interesting. Now they are saying that “we are not 
speaking on this issue because it is an issue for the citizens”. With this attitude they are much more 
dangerous. And much more intelligent, of course.” (Interview with Ximena Castilla) 
 
Accessible human rights institutions 
Risse et al. point to the importance for accessible state institutions for successful human rights 
work. There is no doubt how important the access to the Constitutional Court was for the 
LAICIA network. Without that possibility they would have once again been dependent on the 
conservative Congress. But the opinions are divided whether the Constitutional Court is really 
accessible to everyone in Colombia. The judge at the court and several of the lawyers I spoke 
to maintain that it is very easy to access the court, while other interviewees point to the fact 
that, even though it is free of charge, in reality means for covering expenses is a need, as well 
as a knowledge of how the judicial system works.    
    
Domestic opposition was more important for the outcome  
Many of my interviewees emphasized that this process would not have been possible without 
the knowledge and the support, both financial and other forms of support from international 
organizations. They also pointed to the importance that international human rights 
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conventions had in this process, and how earlier commitments made the state understand their 
obligations to protect women from the consequences of illegal abortion.  
All throughout their study Risse et al. stresses transnational activism. However, among my 
interviewees opinions were divided about whether transnational activism was the key to the 
LAICIA network’s success. The conservative opposition emphasized above all the support 
that was given to the LAICIA network by foreign organizations and institutions. They were 
very critical to the financial support and they denied that they had themselves received any 
such support from international pro-life organizations. Among the authorities and within the 
LAICIA network a few persons considered that the international support had been crucial, 
while others said that there were enough arguments within the country for most people to 
understand that a partial decriminalization of abortion was necessary. 
I believe this is because Colombia already found itself in the third phase of the Spiral model, 
where Risse et al. expect that the activities are now transferred from the transnational level to 
the growing domestic opposition. (Risse et al. 1999:32) This is also supported by the fact that 
it was never necessary for the LAICIA network to contact foreign liberal government to put 
pressure on the Colombian government.  
From the beginning of the process the issue of illegal abortion was already on the 
international agenda, and according to many of the women's rights activists I talked to, the 
real challenge was to reach out to the national public and to put the abortion issue on the 
domestic agenda. During the process it was above all the change within Colombia; in the state 
institutions, in the mass media and among the public that was remarkable. Several persons 
within in the LAICIA network, as well as among the authorities, maintained that they had 
never expected the attention, the media coverage and the lively debate that the campaign for a 
decriminalization of abortion led to within the country. The LAICIA network conducted a 
successful communication campaign that put the issue on the national agenda and this brought 
as a result that the public opinion swung in favor of a decriminalization. I therefore conclude 
that the domestic opposition in Colombia had a greater importance for the outcome of this 
case, than what Risse et al. presuppose in the Spiral model of human rights change. 
 
The socialization of the abortion issue 
The Spiral model of human rights change is a model of the process of norm socialization. The 
ultimate goal for the LAICIA network is to make people believe in and behave according to 
the partial decriminalization of abortion, which is the final step in the process of norms 
socialization. A successful trial and an effective communication campaign have taken the 
network a great deal closer to their goal, although there are still parts of the public that do not 
agree with a decriminalization of abortion. The society is in end of the socialization process, 
institutionalization and habitualization. The issue of abortion has gone from being a taboo to 
being talked about in the media and among people. Another of the initial objectives with the 
LAICIA network was to show the civil society and especially the women's rights groups how 
to work strategically with the courts to endorse sexual and reproductive rights. The success of 
the LAICIA network has been an inspiration to many people, above all women, and ratifies 
that it is possible to promote women's rights by demanding compliance with international 
human rights.     
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5.2 What enabled a partial decriminalization of abortion against all odds? 
 
In an attempt to further develop the Spiral model I have divided the actions and interactions 
among the involved actors in each phase of the model into either promoting or preventing for 
the partial decriminalization of abortion in Colombia. Despite the fact that my interviewees 
expressed many different views on the development, their role and the role of others, this 
division within the model has helped me to clearly see the circumstances and actions that have 
been the most promoting for the final outcome. I have been able to narrow it down to a few 
central points that I conclude have been decisive for the success of the LAICIA network in 
Colombia; 
 
Networking was their starting point 
When Women's Link Worldwide started to work in Colombia their first priority became to 
connect with as many interested partners as possible. They first connected with La Mesa and 
together they traveled all over the country to meet women, lawyers, doctors and organizations 
that wanted to decriminalize abortion. In the LAICIA network the different point of views and 
knowledge were transformed in to new initiatives and actions. When they started the 
campaign they had a large group of expertise, both to cover all perspectives of the abortion 
issue and to separate the ongoing debate in each field. This made the LAICIA network strong, 
trustworthy and well-known within their field of expertise.    
 
Access to human rights oriented institutions 
Without the Constitution of 1991, that laid the foundation for the possibility of any citizen to 
file a complaint in the Constitutional court, the LAICIA process would never have been 
possible. The conservative Congress was constantly blocking any attempt to decriminalize 
abortion and the women's rights groups should probably have had to wait for many years to 
come before it would have been possible in this forum.  
 
The state was entrapped  
The state found itself entrapped in its human rights rhetoric. It seems like the state did not 
realize what ratified human rights conventions would mean in a new world context. The 
LAICIA network was always one step ahead and the complaint surprised both state 
representatives and the conservative opposition. The network was well prepared and has 
studied each of the judges in the Constitutional court and earlier sentences about abortion and 
other reproductive rights matters. They knew that the Constitutional court has a good 
reputation of being respectful of human rights and they argued that this was the time to be 
consistent.  
 
The debate was effectively framed 
For many years the debate about abortions had been ruled by the Catholic Church and it had 
always evolved around the unborn child and the holy motherhood. The LAICIA network 
carefully framed the issue of illegal abortion as a public health issue. They also framed it to be 
a matter of social equality, human rights and women's self-determination. The network 
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refused to discuss religious arguments and referred to that Colombia is a secular state. In the 
end of their campaign the public opinion had changed dramatically.  
 
A successful communication campaign 
To create a positive image of a the complaint to the Constitutional Court among the public 
Women's Link Worldwide turned to the communication agency Brújula Comunicaciones, and 
the agency designed the general strategy.   
Before the LAICIA network made their complaint to the court public they had carefully 
prepared their arguments related to public health, psychology, national law and international 
human rights. When they eventually presented the appeal and let the media know about the 
content and the arguments, their point of view was already known in the public sphere. The 
campaign was planned at an international, national, regional and local level, trying to have a 
constant dialog with national and international organizations, academics in the field, the 
medical community and with influential people in the public debate.  During the process the 
LAICIA network was always visible, both in the media and on the streets.  
 
Valuable knowledge, connections and financial support  
Since Mónica Roa, the initiator of the project and the principal figure of the campaign, had 
worked abroad with cases of sexual- and reproductive rights, she had a good knowledge of the 
argumentation and the strategies that were used. In addition, Roa had valuable international 
contacts within the field and she knew who she could ask for support. A few of the 
interviewees within the LAICIA network have pointed out that in order for the network to be 
listened to it was a great advantage that Roa belongs to the upper-middle class and have had 
the opportunity to study abroad, as well as at one of the most prestigious universities in 
Colombia. Because of this she had a network of key people working within the judicial 
system, the media or other influential institutions in the society, and this facilitated the 
network’s possibilities to reach out to public institutions and to the mass media. Mónica Roa 
herself believes that the fact that she was not a famous person in Colombia or known to 
belong to a certain political group, made people more open-minded to what she had to say. 
Like many other non-governmental organizations Women's Link Worldwide, has both private 
and international donors that help financing their projects. Without these donors it would not 
have been possible to run the effective communication campaign.   
 
6 Suggestions for future research 
 
I believe that the final implementation of the decriminalization of abortion in Colombia is a 
very interesting area for future research. One possible idea is to follow up on the detailed 
regulations to see if they are complied with and if the service is available in all parts of 
Colombia. This is especially important now that the case is no longer covered by the media or 
by international organizations.  
Another possible area of research is the Spiral model of human rights change. For a better 
understanding of how different international human rights can be incorporated into a variety 
of domestic contexts further research on the model is needed. It can also be explored what 
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makes certain states pressure norm-violating states to comply with human rights, or the 
reverse influence that norm-violating state may have on human rights norms. 
This study has shown a vide range of possibilities for both international and domestic human 
rights groups to influence the adoption of human rights within the state. I believe that the 
success of the LAICIA network can inspire researchers to look closer at the interesting 
combination of law, politics, networking and lobbying that has proved to be effective to 
promote human rights, especially within the field of sexual and reproductive rights. In order 
to understand the power and weaknesses of these working methods, and how they can be 
developed, researchers should pay more attention towards transnational advocacy networks.   
 
Epilogue 
 
In May of 2007, six months after my interviews in Colombia and a year after abortion was 
partially decriminalized, I talked again to Mónica Roa, the initiator of the LAICIA project. 
Many problems still need to be solved for abortion to be accessible for all women in need, but 
the full implementation of the partial decriminalization goes in the right direction, according 
to Roa. The state has now implemented all legal regulations in compliance with the court’s 
decision. From May 2006 to May 2007 a total of 60 women have had legal abortions in the 
country. Many of them did not have health insurance and the state paid for the procedure.  
For some time before the decision of the court became legally binding the conservative 
opposition, led by Ilva Hoyos from the pro-life organization The Future of Colombia, started 
a legal process to declare the court’s decision invalid. Objection was raised against three of 
the judges that had voted in favor for a decriminalization. But in December, 2006 the 
opposition’s request was rejected and the original decision was declared valid by a unanimous 
Constitutional Court.   
Now that the legal battle is over, experts on policy implementation have taken over. The 
LAICIA network continues to monitor the implementation, to support women in need of 
abortion and to communicate the court’s decision to all women. Both the network and the 
Colombian government have invested in campaigns for advertising and education to let all 
citizens know about the implications of the partial decriminalization of abortion.  
Mónica Roa emphasizes that the LAICIA-project was a good example to show the country 
that it is possible to attain social change by working within the state institutions. But to 
change cultures and traditions takes time. Still, in the beginning of this process it was taboo to 
talk about abortion, today people discuss it openly. Before politicians were afraid to touch this 
sensitive subject, but at the 2006 elections political parties asked Mónica Roa to join their 
campaign.  
 Appendix A 
 
Earlier attempts to liberalize abortion laws in Colombia (all denied)41 
 
In the Congress 
The following congressmen have proposed bills to allow therapeutic abortion, i.e. abortion in 
the case of rape, to save the life or the health of the pregnant woman and when the fetus has 
defects incompatible with life. The propositions from 1989 and forward also suggest allowing 
legal abortion due to socio-economic circumstances.  
 
1975 Iván López Botero, senator Liberal party 
1979 Consuelo Lleras de Samper, Liberal party 
1987 Eduardo Romo Rosero, Liberal party 
1989 Emilio Urrea Delgado, Liberal party  
1993 Vera Grabe, Alianza Democrática-M19  
1993 Ana García de Petchalt  
2002 Piedad Córdoba, senator Liberal party 
 
 
Proposals to reform the Penal Code 
 
1998 Margarita Londoño proposed an exception to the abortion ban in case of therapeutic and 
socio-economic reasons. 
2000 (approx.) Alfonso Gomez Mendez proposed that the judge can chose not to impose the 
penalty for a woman who has had an abortion under extraordinary circumstances.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
41
 La Mesa por la Vida y la Salud de Mujeres www.despenalizaciondelaborto.org.co/ 
 
 Appendix B 
Interview guide 
My interviews were semi-structured in the sense that the questions were formulated in 
advance and I posed for most part the same questions to all of my interviewees. But to keep 
each interview dynamic I sometimes added questions depending on the experience and 
knowledge of the interviewee and I allowed room for the respondent to expound her view on 
the process. (Kvale 1997)  
 
Phase 1 
 
Repression 
•    Which organizations have opposed a 
decriminalization of abortion? 
•  How is the general situation for 
women’s rights organizations in 
Colombia? 
 
 
Activation of network 
• Do you remember when the process to 
decriminalize abortion first started in 
Colombia? 
• Who were the main actors? 
• When did your organization first start 
to work on the issue? 
 
• Have your organization worked on 
similar issues of reproductive rights 
before? 
• Have your organization worked with 
the Colombian legal system before? 
• Who are your main allies today? 
Phase 2 
 
Put the issue on the international agenda 
 
• Do you think there was anything in 
particular that happened, in the 
beginning of the campaign, which 
raised people’s attention to the issue of 
abortion? 
• What did your organization do to call 
attention to the issue at a national and 
international level? 
• Have there been any personal stories 
about abortion that have influenced 
people on the issue? 
• Did your organization ask other 
countries or international organizations 
for support of the issue? 
 
 
“World time” 
• Is it important to the Colombian 
government what other countries think 
about abortion or women’s rights in 
Colombia? 
 
 
“Framing”  
• What difference do you think it made 
when the network presented abortion 
as a health issue and not a moral issue? 
• Was it difficult to convince the 
Colombian public about this way of 
looking at abortion? 
 
Denial of the state 
• How did the state representatives 
reacted on the criticism by the 
transnational network during the 
campaign? 
• What would you respond to the 
Catholic priest who says that “the new 
abortion law is a fruit of international 
pressure that disrespect the 
Colombians”? 
 
Normative commitments 
• Do you think the international 
conventions on women’s rights and 
health that the government previously 
ratified posed a moral problem to them, 
when they did not want to change the 
law on abortion? 
  
 
Phase 3 
Tactical concessions 
• The Constitution of 1991 has a much 
bigger focus on human rights than 
previous constitutions, do you think 
this is due to international or national 
pressure? 
• Did the Constitutional Court try to do 
any kind of compromise with your 
organization instead of changing the 
law?  
 
The states self-entrapment and  “controlled 
liberalization”  
 
• What did the Constitution of 1991 
mean to Colombian women and 
women’s rights? 
• Do you think the state knew that the 
decision to include so much in the 
Constitution of 1991 could come back 
and hunt them in the abortion issue?  
• Does your organization have a 
dialogue with the government on the 
abortion issue? 
 
 
 
 
“World time”- A new world context 
• What is the role of the courts to 
promote women’s rights in Colombia? 
• Are some women’s rights more 
appropriate to take to the courts than 
others?  
• Why do you think the state went so far 
as to include international conventions 
in the Constitution? 
• Why do you think that this time the 
women’s organizations decided to act 
in the court and not the Congress? 
• The possibility to do this has existed 
since 1991, why do you think that the 
women’s group didn’t think about this 
earlier? 
 
Phase 4 
 
Prescriptive status  
 
• Do you feel like the government 
respect the new law and try to 
implement it? 
• Does your organization have a 
dialogue with the government? 
• If a woman needs an abortion today in 
Colombia, what can they do? 
 
 
• What do you think the law will mean 
for women in rural areas or women 
with very limited economical 
resources, for example in the informal 
work sector? 
• Is there any institution where women 
can object the decision if they are 
denied an abortion according to the 
law? 
• What do you think about the 
possibilities for women to get 
information about the new law and the 
option of abortion? 
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